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Introduction
Indian tribes have suffered many defeats at the Supreme Court in the
twenty-first century. Among others, the Court has limited tribal civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers,1 restricted the application of the Indian
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts. J.D., 2018, Stanford Law School; B.A., 2013, Harvard
College.
First-place winner, American Indian Law Review 2017-2018 Writing Competition.
1. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320
(2008).
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Child Welfare Act,2 and diminished federal power to take tribal land into
trust.3 Overall, tribes lost 82% of cases before the Roberts Court through
2015.4
Of all these defeats, the most significant may turn out to be an
idiosyncratic decision from 2005: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.5
This decision was the last of three times the Supreme Court ruled on the
longstanding land claim of the Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) against New
York and its municipalities. In the late 1990s, the OIN purchased parcels on
the open market within the boundaries of its treaty-guaranteed reservation,
land New York unlawfully purchased from the tribe two centuries earlier.6
The OIN sought immunity from local property taxation for this land on the
ground that Congress never extinguished its sovereign authority over the
area.7 The Court denied the OIN tax immunity based on the length of time
the OIN failed to exercise sovereignty over the area and the justifiable
expectations of non-Indian landowners and state and local governments.8
Sherrill left scholars confused. In addition to criticizing the Court’s
analysis,9 they wondered how far its reasoning extended. Some thought
Sherrill’s unique facts involving an open-market purchase of land by a tribe
within its historic reservation would make it difficult to apply to other
contexts.10 Others feared courts would adopt the generalizable concerns in
Sherrill about disruption to non-Indian expectations to deny a wide range of
tribal claims.11 The Second Circuit’s statement a few months after the

2. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 641-42 (2013).
3. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009).
4. Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?:
Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1901, 1907 (comparing this percentage to the 71% loss rate for tribes during the
Rehnquist Court).
5. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
6. Id. at 211.
7. Id. at 211-12.
8. Id. at 202-03.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 77-86.
10. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME.
L. REV. 1, 15 (2008).
11. See Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
41 TULSA. L. REV. 5, 10-11 (2005) [hereinafter Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript].
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decision that Sherrill “dramatically altered the legal landscape” only
heightened these fears.12
Courts have been equally confused over the extent to which Sherrill’s
concerns about disruption to non-Indian expectations should bar tribal
claims. The Second Circuit, with strong dissents and some pushback from
district courts, has read Sherrill to require dismissal of all tribal land claims
regardless of whether the tribe seeks ejectment of current landowners,
monetary damages, or declaratory relief.13 Courts have split on whether
Sherrill applies to reservation diminishment and other sovereign treaty
rights disputes14 or prohibits tribes from asserting sovereign immunity in
certain cases.15 In opinions on reservation diminishment and the
constitutionality of the land-to-trust process in the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA), Justice Thomas has suggested that he supports a broad
understanding of Sherrill’s reach.16 Even a tribal court has applied Sherrill
to bar recovery in a marital property dispute.17
These disputes over the true meaning of the Sherrill decision have taken
on even more significance in the past four years as litigants opposing tribal
interests have advanced new arguments based on Sherrill at the Supreme
Court. In Nebraska v. Parker, for example, Nebraska argued the Court
should alter its longstanding reservation diminishment test focused on
congressional intent to emphasize modern demographics and jurisdictional
history because of Sherrill’s concerns about disruption to non-Indian
expectations; an amicus brief in support of Nebraska even proposed that the
Court find diminishment based solely on non-Indian inhabitance and
12. Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 11 (citing this statement as “evidence of
City of Sherrill’s huge potential outside of the taxation context”).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2, II.B.3.
15. See infra Section II.B.4.
16. See Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States, No. 16-1320, 2017 WL
5660979, at *2 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denials of certiorari)
(citing Sherrill to argue that taking 13,000 acres of OIN land into trust would burden state
and local governments and harm neighboring landowners); Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct.
1072, 1082 (2016) (“[W]e express no view about whether equitable considerations of laches
and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe's power to tax the retailers of Pender in light of the
Tribe's century-long absence from the disputed lands.” (citing City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217-21 (2005))).
17. See Smith v. Watty, 6 Cherokee Rep. 31, 31-32 (E. Cherokee Ct. 2007) (using
Sherill to apply laches as a bar to a woman seeking distribution of her interests in marital
property because she made her motion twenty-five years after her divorce and fifteen years
after the end of activity in her divorce case).
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regulation of the reservation, regardless of congressional intent.18 During
the October 2017 term, the Court granted certiorari in United States v.
Washington, a dispute between a number of tribes, joined by the federal
government, and Washington over whether the state is violating tribal treaty
fishing rights by maintaining culverts that prevent the movement of fish. 19
Echoing the position of seven Ninth Circuit judges dissenting from the
court’s decision not to rehear the case en banc, Washington argued that the
panel erred in declining to adjudicate its waiver and estoppel defenses
because Sherrill held that equitable defenses can apply to Indian treaty
rights and thus abrogated circuit precedent to the contrary.20 These recent,
broad arguments based on Sherrill that litigants have proposed to the
Supreme Court make it important to determine whether Sherrill reaches as
far as they suggest.
Sherrill is a confusing decision because it does not fit in any doctrinal
category within federal Indian law.21 Although the OIN was attempting to
assert sovereign authority within its reservation, the Court explicitly noted
that Sherrill did not address reservation diminishment.22 The OIN’s suit
sought tax immunity, but the Court did not cite its jurisprudence on the
ability of state and local governments to tax tribes. The Court did not
discuss tribal sovereign immunity, despite the obvious question of whether
courts could force the OIN to pay property taxes. Given this avoidance of
traditional doctrinal analysis, it is easy to dismiss Sherrill as inapplicable
beyond its unique facts.
But Sherrill’s amorphous nature creates the risk of exactly what some
courts have done with it: denying a broad range of tribal claims to avoid
disrupting non-Indian expectations with “dormant” tribal rights. Many
tribes could not exercise their legal rights for many years for a number of
reasons, including a lack of resources, barriers in access to the court system,
and the attempts of federal, state, and local governments to deny tribes their

18. See infra notes 296-97.
19. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 968 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).
20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25-28, Washington, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (No. 17269); see also United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 2017)
(O’Scannlain, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Sherrill made clear that laches
can apply to Indian treaty rights . . . .”), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832
(2018).
21. See Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 10.
22. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 215 n.9 (2005).
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rights.23 In some sense then, non-Indians have developed expectations that
tribes simply do not exist. By prioritizing non-Indian expectations, Sherrill
provides a potential basis for a doctrine that prohibits tribes from exercising
their legal rights in any capacity. This understanding of Sherrill could
create a simple rule in federal Indian law: tribes lose.
This reading of Sherrill is unwarranted. Sherrill does not require courts
to always prioritize preventing disruption to non-Indian expectations over
tribal rights. Courts applying Sherrill this broadly have ignored key aspects
of the decision. In the request by the OIN for tax immunity, the Court was
confronted with a unique, forward-looking remedy seeking a revival of
sovereignty in a tribal land claim, in contrast to the standard tribal request
for damages in such actions.24 This remedy concerned the Court because of
the risk of prospective disruption to non-Indians, as well as state and local
governments, two centuries after the unlawful dispossession of the land.25
The Court did not address the underlying right, other non-disruptive
remedies for tribal land claims, or other types of disputes. This more
faithful and limited reading of Sherrill demonstrates that concerns about
disruption to non-Indian expectations should not bar damages and
declaratory remedies for tribal land claims.26 Courts faithfully applying
Sherrill should also decline to utilize its disruption framework in disputes
about reservation diminishment, other tribal treaty rights, or sovereign
immunity. Those cases involve assertions of tribal sovereignty as the
essence of the tribal claim or defense, not solely as the remedy, and
concerns about disruption are not as acute in these contexts.27 Only when
tribes seek to assert sovereignty as a remedy in a land claim should courts
apply Sherrill’s disruption analysis.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the OIN
land claim and a summary of the Sherrill decision. Part II explores how
lower courts have applied Sherrill in a range of cases involving Indian
tribes, including tribal land claims and sovereignty disputes. Part III closely
23. See, e.g., id. at 205-06 (describing the policy of the federal government during the
1800s of removing tribes from their ancestral lands); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of
the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 615-27 (2006)
(noting many legal and practical obstacles the OIN and other tribes faced in bringing
lawsuits to vindicate their tribal land rights).
24. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 229
(1985).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Section IV.A.
27. See infra Section IV.B.
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analyzes Sherrill to demonstrate that it only applies to tribal land claims and
only bars certain remedies in those cases. Part IV utilizes this understanding
of Sherrill to explain how lower courts have applied the decision well
beyond its limits.
I. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation
Before the arrival of European colonists, the Oneidas inhabited
approximately six million acres in New York.28 Under pressure to open
land for white settlers, New York entered into the Treaty of Fort Schuyler
with the Oneidas in 1788 to acquire all but three hundred thousand acres of
Oneida land.29 Two years later, Congress passed the Nonintercourse Act,
which prohibited sales of tribal land without federal permission.30 In 1794,
the United States and six tribes in New York (the Haudenosaunee) signed
the Treaty of Canandaigua, which guaranteed the Oneidas use of their
reservation.31 Ignoring the Nonintercourse Act and this treaty, New York
continued purchasing land from the Oneidas without federal approval.32
Most significantly, in 1795, New York bought one hundred thousand acres
of the Oneida reservation.33 Although the federal government initially
objected to these transfers, it began to encourage them as part of “a policy
designed to open reservation lands to white settlers and to remove tribes
westward.”34 In 1838, the Oneidas and the United States signed the Treaty
of Buffalo Creek, which permitted the removal of tribal members remaining
in New York to Kansas.35 By then, New York had purchased all but five
thousand acres of the Oneida reservation.36 Over the next eighty years, the
28. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203. For the sake of clarity, I use “OIN” to refer to the modern
federally recognized tribe that brought the land claim and “Oneidas” to refer to the tribe that
resided in New York before the arrival of European colonists. See, e.g., Oneida Indian
Nation v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408, 415 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011).
29. Treaty of Fort Schuyler, N.Y.-Oneida, Sept. 22, 1788, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, APPOINTED BY LAW FOR THE EXTINGUISHMENT
OF INDIAN TITLES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 241 (Franklin B. Hough ed., Albany, N.Y.,
Joel Munsell 1861), https://archive.org/details/proceedingsofcom01newy/page/n263;
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203.
30. Indian Nonintercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138; Sherrill, 544 U.S.
at 204.
31. Treaty of Canandaigua, art. 2, 7 Stat. 44, 45 (1794); Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 204-05.
32. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 205.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Treaty of Buffalo Creek, art. 2, 7 Stat. 550, 551 (1838); Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 206.
36. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 206.
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Oneida land holdings in New York dwindled to only thirty-two acres by
1920.37
In 1970, the OIN instituted a test case against Oneida and Madison
Counties in New York. The suit alleged that the 1795 sale of one hundred
thousand acres to New York “violated the Nonintercourse Act and thus did
not terminate the [OIN’s] right to possession”; the OIN sought damages for
the fair rental value for 1968 and 1969 of the 872 acres of land the counties
owned.38 The OIN land claim took a long, tortured road through the federal
courts over forty-one years, reaching the Supreme Court three times.39 The
Supreme Court held in Oneida I that the suit raised a federal question for
the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction.40 Eleven years later, the Court
determined in Oneida II that the OIN had a private right of action under
federal common law for the unlawful dispossession of its lands and rejected
a number of defenses that might have barred a damages award.41 The Court
declined to decide whether laches barred the OIN’s claim because the
counties failed to raise the issue at the Second Circuit; it strongly suggested,
however, that laches would not apply because, among other reasons, the
“application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be
novel.”42 The Court left open the question of “whether equitable
considerations should limit the relief available” to the tribe.43 Writing for
four dissenting justices, Justice Stevens asserted that he would have reached
the laches question and barred the claim due to the unjustified delay of over
175 years before the OIN brought suit.44 On remand, the district court
awarded the OIN approximately $35,000 plus prejudgment interest.45
In an attempt to reconstitute its reservation in the late 1990s, the OIN
repurchased on the open market some of the land it sold to New York two
centuries earlier.46 The City of Sherrill (“the City”) attempted to collect
property taxes from the OIN for the parcels within its borders.47 When the
37. Id. at 207.
38. Id. at 208.
39. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197; Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
40. 414 U.S. at 675.
41. 470 U.S. at 233-36, 240-50.
42. Id. at 244-45, 244 n.16.
43. Id. at 253 n.27.
44. Id. at 255-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 217 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (N.D.N.Y.
2002).
46. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211 (2005).
47. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

250

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

OIN argued that its sovereign authority over the parcels exempted them
from state and local taxation, the City initiated eviction proceedings.48 In
response, the OIN filed an action in the Northern District of New York to
enjoin the proceedings.49 Both the district court and the Second Circuit
analyzed whether the repurchased parcels were Indian Country and thus
exempt from state and local taxation.50 The district court held that the 1794
Treaty of Canandaigua created the Oneida Reservation and that no
congressional act, including the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek,
disestablished it; therefore, the parcels were in Indian Country and not
subject to local taxation.51 The Second Circuit affirmed.52 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on four questions relating to whether the parcels
were Indian Country.53
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed on
grounds distinct from the Indian Country questions on which it granted
certiorari.54 The Court did not disturb the Second Circuit’s holding that the
parcels were within the undiminished Oneida Reservation.55 Instead, asking
whether the OIN could assert sovereignty over the parcels after it “unified
fee and aboriginal title” through open market purchases, the Court held that
“‘standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice’ preclude[d]
the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”56
Recognizing the distinction between rights and remedies, the Court
acknowledged that the OIN had a cause of action for damages for unlawful
dispossession from Oneida II.57 But it determined that the relief the OIN
sought here, the ability to assert tax immunity for the parcels, was
unavailable due to the two centuries of state sovereign control, the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 211-12.
50. Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2003); Oneida
Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
51. Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
52. Sherrill, 337 F.3d at 167.
53. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 542 U.S. 936 (2004) (granting the
City’s writ of certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197 (No. 03855) (listing the four questions presented for review).
54. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 212, 214 n.8 (acknowledging that it “resolv[ed] this case on
considerations not discretely identified in the parties’ briefs,” but determining that the issue
it addressed was “inextricably linked to, and [was] thus ‘fairly included’ within, the
questions presented” (quoting SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a))).
55. See id. at 215 n.9.
56. Id. at 213-14 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61, 90
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)).
57. See id. at 213.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/8

No. 1]

SPECIAL FEATURE

251

significant increase in the parcels’ value over that period, and the delay of
the OIN in asserting its sovereignty.58 It also emphasized the “justifiable
expectations” of the current non-Indian landowners regarding New York’s
continuing regulatory authority.59 According to the Court, “[t]his long lapse
of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their sovereign
control through equitable relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes
in the character of the properties, preclude[d] OIN from gaining the
disruptive remedy it [sought].”60
The Court relied on three equitable doctrines to support its holding:
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.61 First, the Court stated that a “long
lapse of time . . . can preclude relief” and that laches “may bar longdormant claims for equitable relief.”62 The Court noted that it had
previously applied “laches in Felix v. Patrick to bar the heirs of an Indian
from establishing a constructive trust over land their Indian ancestor had
conveyed in violation of a statutory restriction.”63 According to the Court,
the heirs were barred because the land had been sold to other owners,
incorporated into a major city, and was worth significantly more than when
the Indian received the land.64 The Court thought the OIN suit implicated
the same “sort of changes to the value and character of the land . . . in even
greater magnitude.”65
Second, the Court analogized to the doctrine of acquiescence in interstate
boundary disputes. The Court recognized that “[l]ong acquiescence in the
possession of territory and the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it
may have a controlling effect in the determination of a disputed boundary,”
regardless of the “original validity of a boundary line.”66 The Court
58. See id. at 214-15. In a concurrence, Justice Souter argued that these considerations
defeated not only the remedy the OIN sought, but also their right. See id. at 222 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (“The Tribe’s inaction cannot . . . be ignored here as affecting only a remedy to
be considered later; it is, rather, central to the very claims of right made by the contending
parties.”).
59. See id. at 215-16.
60. Id. at 216-17; see also id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks . . . is unavailable
because of the long lapse of time, during which New York’s governance remained
undisturbed, and the present-day and future disruption such relief would engender.”).
61. Id. at 221.
62. Id. at 216-17.
63. Id. at 217 (citation omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 218 (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 651 (1973); Massachusetts v.
New York, 271 U.S. 65, 95 (1926)).
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therefore reasoned that “[w]hen a party belatedly asserts a right to present
and future sovereign control over territory, longstanding observances and
settled expectations are prime considerations.”67 Since the OIN had not
exercised sovereignty in the area for two centuries, permitting them to
reassert sovereignty one parcel at a time “would dishonor ‘the historic
wisdom in the value of repose.’”68
Third, the Court emphasized “the impracticability of returning to Indian
control land that generations earlier passed into numerous private hands.” 69
Rejecting the argument that the impossibility doctrine did not apply because
the OIN did not seek to eject landowners, the Court feared that “the
unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign control . . .
would have disruptive practical consequences.”70 With an Indian population
in Sherrill of less than 1%, the “checkerboard of alternating state and tribal
jurisdiction . . . would ‘seriously burde[n] the administration of state and
local governments’ and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the
tribal patches.”71 The Court expressed special concern about the OIN
seeking zoning exemptions.72
Justice Stevens dissented alone.73 He thought the majority did “what only
Congress may do” by “effectively proclaim[ing] a diminishment of the
Tribe’s reservation and an abrogation of its elemental right to tax
immunity.”74 He also found it nonsensical as a matter of equity to hold that
non-Indian reliance interests barred tribal tax immunity but not Oneida II’s
67. Id.
68. Id. at 218-19 (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 262 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
69. Id. at 219.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 211, 219-20 (alteration in original) (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421
(1994)).
72. Id. at 220 (“If OIN may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and remove these
parcels from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new
generation of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that
protect all landowners in the area.”). The Court cited two pending tribal suits seeking to
exempt repurchased land from zoning laws. See id. at 220 n.13 (citing Seneca-Cayuga
Tribe v. Town of Aurelius, No. 5:03-CV-00690 (NPM), 2004 WL 1945359, at *1-3
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Village of Union Springs, 317 F. Supp.
2d 128, 131-34, 147-48 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)).
73. His dissent was especially notable given his position in Oneida II that laches barred
the OIN’s claim for damages. See supra text accompanying note 44; see also Sherrill, 544
U.S. at 221 n.14 (“Justice STEVENS, after vigorously urging the application of laches to
block further proceedings in Oneida II, now faults the Court for rejecting the claim
presented here.” (citation omitted)).
74. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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damages remedy.75 Finally, he criticized the majority for relying on
concerns about future zoning disputes not at issue in the case.76
Scholars have criticized Sherrill on numerous fronts. On doctrinal
grounds, some questioned the Court’s focus on laches because it did not
apply the traditional laches test of unreasonable delay and prejudice.77 If it
had done so, it would have recognized the efforts of the OIN to assert its
rights despite numerous legal, political, and economic barriers.78 Others
noted that the Court’s worries about checkerboard jurisdiction emerged
only because of its jurisprudence on state and tribal authority in Indian
Country.79 Yet more found unpersuasive the notion that granting the OIN
tax immunity would be disruptive.80 Property scholars were skeptical about
the Court’s desire to protect the expectations of non-Indian landowners
whose title derived from an unlawful dispossession.81 They also criticized
75. See id. at 226.
76. Id. at 222, 226. If such considerations were relevant, Justice Stevens thought the
majority exaggerated the risk of excessive tribal powers, noting that New York’s strong
interest would permit it to continue applying zoning ordinances to the OIN parcels and that
the OIN could not tax or otherwise regulate non-Indian lands within their reservation. See id.
at 226 n.6.
77. See, e.g., Curtis Berkey, Recent Development, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 378 (2005-2006). Additionally, as Justice Stevens’
dissent noted, the City likely waived these equitable defenses. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 225
n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty, the
Negative Doctrinal Feedback Loop, and the Rise of a New Exceptionalism, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 47, 54 (2005) [hereinafter Krakoff, Renaissance].
78. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 14-15 (arguing that the
Tribe did not delay in pursuing its claims because it brought suit against the United States in
1893 and 1951 when the United States waived its sovereign immunity and that it could not
sue in New York state courts without statutory authorization); Singer, supra note 23, at 61527 (noting many legal and practical obstacles that prevented the OIN from suing to
invalidate New York’s land purchase, including the difficulty of finding and paying a
lawyer, the inability of tribes to sue in state and federal courts without congressional
authorization, state sovereign immunity, and uncertainty over whether the tribe had a private
right of action raising a federal question).
79. See, e.g., Joshua L. Sohn, Note and Comment, The Double-Edged Sword of Indian
Gaming, 42 TULSA L. REV. 139, 163-64 (2006).
80. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that the
Counties only had to slightly adjust their property tax system to make up for the lost revenue
and that the OIN partially compensated local governments for lost revenue); Ezra Rosser,
Protecting Non-Indians from Harm? The Property Consequences of Indians, 87 OR. L. REV.
175, 196, 210-11 (2008) (demonstrating that proximity to a reservation does not make land
less valuable and arguing that because land would be worth more to a tax-exempt tribe,
landowners could sell property to the tribe at a premium).
81. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 23, at 610.
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the decision for leaving the OIN with title to the land but no associated
rights and, conversely, leaving non-Indians with all the property rights
associated with ownership without formal title.82 Some believed that
Sherrill’s reasoning conflicted with the Nonintercourse Act, which made
New York’s land purchase invalid both in law and equity.83 Others noted
that the decision presumed a strange notion of sovereignty that fades with
time.84
Scholars also criticized Sherrill on policy grounds. The decision
seemingly defied recent federal policy supporting tribal independence and
sovereignty.85 In doing so, some thought it usurped the role of Congress in
managing tribal-state relations, even though Congress never indicated
concern about the settled expectations the Court purported to protect.86 The
Court’s decision also permitted New York to avoid the consequences of its
misconduct simply because a significant period of time had passed.87 The
only scholarly defense of Sherrill argued that, due to the difficulty of
adjudicating historical facts, the Court was right to maintain the status quo
and leave what were ultimately policy issues to the political branches.88
In the thirteen years since the decision, the Supreme Court has not
responded to these criticisms, nor has it explained Sherrill’s holding any
further. In fact, the justices have cited Sherrill only four times. Two of these
citations were for matters of Supreme Court procedure.89 The other two
82. See, e.g., id.
83. See, e.g., id. at 608-09.
84. See Krakoff, Renaissance, supra note 77, at 54.
85. See Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 6, 18.
86. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Tribal Rights of Action, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 499,
550 (2014).
87. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 6 (“[T]he Court is
embracing an apologist stand toward the many instances of immoral and illegal
governmental actions against the tribe, and ultimately suggesting that the passage of time
renders that history irrelevant, indeed even unmentionable.”); Wenona T. Singel & Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 45 (2005)
(arguing that Sherrill condoned the behavior of those who have “used physical and political
power to dispossess Indian[s] . . . of their lands”).
88. See Availability of Equitable Relief, 119 HARV. L. REV. 347, 354-56 (2005). But see
Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 11 (arguing that the decision “puts the
Court in the role of moral arbiter” by “weighing in on one side of the historical ledger”);
Singer, supra note 23, at 628-29 (arguing that the Court should have ruled for the OIN and
then permitted Congress to figure out how to balance the interests of the OIN and the nonIndian possessors).
89. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 n.1 (2009); Medellin v.
Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 685 n.2 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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brief citations by Justice Thomas suggested that he believes Sherrill’s
concerns about disruption to non-Indian settled expectations could bar tribal
rights beyond the narrow context of land claim litigation.90
II. Applications of Sherrill in the Lower Courts
Despite substantial criticism, Sherrill remains good law, and the decision
itself is almost all we can utilize to determine its scope. The question then
becomes what lower courts should do with the decision. This Part explores
how lower courts have evaluated Sherrill’s scope. First, although the
Second Circuit has encountered some pushback, it has derived a rule from
Sherrill barring all tribal land claims regardless of the remedy the tribe
seeks.91 Second, courts are split on Sherrill’s application to disputes
involving tribal sovereignty, including reservation diminishment claims,92
suits involving other treaty rights,93 and claims of tribal sovereign immunity
from suit.94 As is evident from these lower court decisions, no consensus
has developed on the reach of the Sherrill decision.
A. Tribal Land Claims
1. The Second Circuit’s Inherent Disruption Rule
Sherrill’s greatest impact has been in tribal land claims in the Second
Circuit. Despite adjudicating tribal land claims since the 1970s,95 the
Second Circuit has read Sherrill to bar these claims completely. As the
court stated in 2014, “it is now well-established that Indian land claims
asserted generations after an alleged dispossession are inherently disruptive
of state and local governance and the settled expectations of current
landowners, and are subject to dismissal on the basis of laches,
acquiescence, and impossibility.”96 The court has been inconsistent in
articulating its rule,97 but its application seems to bar all tribal land claims. 98
90. See supra note 16.
91. See infra Section II.A.
92. See infra Section II.B.2.
93. See infra Section II.B.3.
94. See infra Section II.B.4.
95. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 208 (2005) (noting that
the OIN filed its test case against Oneida and Madison Counties in 1970).
96. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2014).
97. Initially, the court articulated a two-step test, first asking whether Sherrill applied to
the claim and then analyzing whether the factors from Sherrill supported dismissal. See
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 125-29 (2d Cir. 2010); Cayuga
Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 276-77 (2d Cir. 2005). Then, likely because it had

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

256

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Under this “inherent disruption rule,” the court has dismissed five tribal
land claims in the twelve years since Sherrill.99 Because the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari in all five cases,100 this rule has ended the era of land
claims in the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit developed its inherent disruption rule for tribal land
claims in two steps. First, in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, the court held
that Sherrill bars “possessory” land claims because they inherently disrupt
non-Indian settled land ownership.101 Before Sherrill, the district court in
Cayuga awarded the tribe almost $250 million in damages and interest for
the fair market value of its dispossessed land and the fair rental value of that
land between the dispossession and judgment.102 After Sherrill, the Second

held that Sherrill applies to all tribal land claims, the court framed its rule as a three-factor
test to determine when Sherrill barred the claim. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F.
App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Three specific factors determine when ancestral land claims
are foreclosed on equitable grounds: (1) ‘the length of time at issue between an historical
injustice and the present day’; (2) ‘the disruptive nature of claims long delayed’; and (3) ‘the
degree to which these claims upset the justifiable expectations of individuals and entities far
removed from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.’” (quoting County of Oneida,
617 F.3d at 127)). Eventually, the court stopped applying these factors and instead
articulated its inherent disruption bar on all tribal land claims. See supra text accompanying
note 96.
98. See, e.g., County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 148 (Gershon, J. dissenting) (“With this
decision, the majority forecloses plaintiffs from bringing any claims seeking any remedy for
their treatment at the hands of the State.”); Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling
the Racial Context of Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV'T
L. REV. 1, 43 (2017) (arguing that the Second Circuit’s approach “den[ies] New York tribes
any remedy whatsoever for the illegal taking of their lands”).
99. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 628 F. App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2015);
Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166; Onondaga Nation, 500 F. App’x at 89-90; County of
Oneida, 617 F.3d at 118; Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 268. The Northern District of New York ruled
on Sherrill’s application in a sixth tribal land claim involving the Mohawks. Because the
court did not dismiss all of the tribe’s claims, see Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v.
New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2013 WL 3992830, at *22 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), the
tribe could not appeal the ruling to the Second Circuit. Since the 2013 decision, the parties
have engaged in extensive settlement negotiations. See, e.g., Joint Status Report and Request
for Extension of Stay Order at 1, Can. St. Regis, No. 5:82-CV-0783 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,
2017); Joint Status Report at 1, Can. St. Regis, No. 5:82-CV-0783 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2013).
100. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016); StockbridgeMunsee Cmty. v. New York, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 571
U.S. 969 (2013); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 565 U.S. 970 (2011); Cayuga
Indian Nation v. Pataki, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006).
101. 413 F.3d at 275.
102. See id. at 271-73.
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Circuit reversed.103 The court reasoned that Sherrill’s broad language about
disruption demonstrated that its equitable defense should apply to any
disruptive tribal land claim, even those that are “legally viable and
[brought] within the statute of limitations.”104 Refusing to distinguish
Sherrill on the basis that the district court here awarded monetary damages
rather than equitable relief permitting the Tribe to assert its sovereignty, the
Second Circuit thought the Cayuga claims were premised on “a continuing
right to immediate possession” and thus were inherently disruptive, even if
relief were monetized.105 Quoting Sherrill, it reasoned that, “[w]hether
characterized as an action at law or in equity, any remedy flowing from this
possessory land claim, which would call into question title to over 60,000
acres of land in upstate New York, can only be understood as a remedy that
would . . . ‘project redress into the present and future.’”106 To justify
applying Sherrill to actions at law, the court also cited the “unusual
considerations at play in this area of the law” and the fact that “ordinary
common law principles are . . . ‘not readily transferrable to this action.’”107
Second, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida extended Cayuga “to
bar any ancient land claims that are disruptive of significant and justified
societal expectations that have arisen as a result of a lapse of time during
which the plaintiffs did not seek relief.”108 The district court held that
Cayuga did not bar the OIN’s claim for fair compensation for its twohundred-year-old land sale to New York because the claim sought only
retrospective relief for damages and was not based on a continuing

103. See id. at 277-78
104. See id. at 273-74.
105. See id. at 274-75.
106. Id. at 275 (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 n.14
(2005)).
107. Id. at 276 (quoting Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 79 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (N.D.N.Y.
1999)). Judge Hall dissented. See id. at 280 (Hall, J., dissenting). She emphasized that laches
and Sherrill’s equitable considerations focused not on the entire claim but on the specific
remedy requested. See id. at 284, 288-89. For the tribe’s ejectment claim, she thought
restoration of possession would be disruptive and prejudicial under Sherrill but awarding
damages would not be. See id. at 284-85. She would also not have barred the trespass claim
because it did not depend on actual possession of the land. See id. at 285. She took special
issue with the majority’s contention that monetary damages would be disruptive in the same
way as the remedy sought in Sherrill. See id. at 290 & n.13 (“The contention that a damages
award for either past fair rental value or present fair market value would ‘project redress into
the present and future’ . . . vitiates any reasonable meaning the Supreme Court could have
intended that phrase to have.” (quoting Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275)).
108. 617 F.3d 114, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
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possessory right.109 The Second Circuit reversed on this issue. It reasoned
that Sherrill and Cayuga’s equitable defense applied to “all ancient land
claims that are disruptive of justified societal interests that have developed
over a long period of time, of which possessory claims are merely one type,
and regardless of the particular remedy sought.”110 The court noted that
Sherrill and Cayuga emphasized the disruptive nature of the remedy or
claim, not whether it was possessory; in fact, Sherrill did not even involve
possession because the OIN already owned the land.111 The court
recognized two versions of the claim at issue: a contract claim by the OIN
for receipt of unconscionable consideration and a claim by the United
States for violation of the Nonintercourse Act. However, it dismissed both
claims because, although the parties only sought monetary damages, the
claims undermined the validity of the land transfer and threw current title
into doubt.112
The Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule is notable for a number of
reasons. To start, it permits courts to dismiss tribal land claims on the
pleadings.113 Although Cayuga and County of Oneida reached the Second
Circuit after a trial and on summary judgment, respectively,114 the Second
Circuit has affirmed district court decisions applying the inherent disruption
rule to bar tribal land claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.115 Tribes are not
109. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137-40 (N.D.N.Y.
2007), aff’d in part and reversed in part sub. nom. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114.
110. See County of Oneida, 617 F.3d. at 136.
111. See id. at 135-36.
112. See id. at 129-30, 136-38. Judge Gershon dissented. See id. at 141 (Gershon, J.,
dissenting). Noting the nonpossessory nature of the claim, she argued that it did not
implicate land possession or ownership at all and thus did not “project redress into the
present and future.” Id. at 145 (quoting Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275). She thought the presence
of the United States in the litigation suing New York for violating a federal statute made the
nonpossessory nature of the claim especially clear. See id. at 147. She also emphasized that
Sherrill and Cayuga concerned “difficult present-day complications that would affect
innocent third-party purchasers and the current value of the developed land”; these concerns
were irrelevant to the OIN’s fair compensation claim since it was no different today than if it
had been brought immediately after the sales to New York. See id. (“[A] fair compensation
remedy would not upset present-day expectations because it has nothing to do with the
present at all.”). Thus, she would have limited Cayuga’s bar to possessory land claims. See
id. at 147-48.
113. See Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 357, 380 (2009).
114. See County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 117; Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 269-73.
115. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, No. 3:86-CV-1140 (LEK/DEP), 2013
WL 3822093, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), aff’d, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014); Onondaga
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entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing116 and cannot present
evidence outside the pleadings.117 Courts rely on judicial notice for
information on the local non-Indian population and development of the
area.118
Moreover, the Second Circuit views the rule as a new equitable defense
combining laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.119 It has therefore
rejected arguments based on traditional laches principles.120 Most
significantly, tribes cannot argue that their delay in bringing suit was
Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 3806492, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New
York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL 3501099, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006), aff’d,
628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015). The Northern District of New York heard a fourth case on a
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v.
New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2012 WL 8503274, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012), report
and recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, 2013 WL 3992830 (N.D.N.Y.
July 23, 2013).
116. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 136-37 (N.D.N.Y.
2007), aff’d in part and reversed in part sub nom. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114.
117. See, e.g., Can. St. Regis, 2012 WL 8503274, at *6 n.15; see also Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 97, 110 (2015) (“In short, no
evidence is necessary in the Second Circuit to dismiss Indian land claims under the
Nonintercourse Act—a court may dismiss them as a matter of law.”).
118. See Onondaga, 500 F. App’x at 89-90. In one case, the district court took judicial
notice of U.S. Census data on the local non-Indian population offered by both parties, which
differed in the scope of the geographical area measured. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL
3992830, at *17-18.
119. See, e.g., Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166; County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 12728.
120. Outside the Second Circuit, some courts have interpreted Sherrill to permit the
application of traditional laches against tribes. An Arizona district court, for example,
applied traditional laches (though without any analysis of whether Sherrill required
otherwise) to a tribal suit to bar access to a federal right-of-way through its land. See In re
Schugg, 384 B.R. 263, 277-78 (D. Ariz. 2008). Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the
court’s laches analysis, it did not contest that laches could apply to the claim. See Lyon v.
Gila River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Mishewal Wappo
Tribe v. Salazar, No. 5:09-cv-02502 EJD, 2011 WL 5038356, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24,
2011) (noting that Sherrill applied traditional laches and suggesting, while not deciding, that
laches could bar a tribal suit for federal recognition and an order requiring the federal
government to take its land into trust since the tribe significantly delayed in bringing suit
after it was terminated, allowing the local municipalities to have developed justifiable
reliance on use of the land at issue); Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 541 F. Supp.
2d 971, 976-80 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (applying traditional laches to bar a tribe from exercising
certain hunting and fishing rights pursuant to its treaty with the federal government), aff’d on
other grounds, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009).
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reasonable,121 even if state and federal governments contributed to the
delay.122 The Second Circuit has also held that, since Sherrill did not rely
on traditional laches, the inherent disruption rule can bar legal relief even if
the claim falls within the statute of limitations.123
Additionally, the specifics of the tribe’s claims are not relevant to the
inherent disruption rule. The rule applies whether the claim is legal or
equitable.124 It applies to whatever relief the tribe seeks,125 even a
declaratory judgment, because “the claims themselves expressly seek to
undermine the validity of the original transfer of the subject lands and
dramatically upset the settled expectations of current land-owners.”126 The
Second Circuit seems to assume a claim is as disruptive as the most
disruptive remedy available, even if the tribe does not seek that remedy or
the court would never award it.127 The inherent disruption rule does not
121. See Onondaga, 500 F. App’x at 90; Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266,
279 (2d Cir. 2005); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006
WL 3501099, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006), aff’d, 628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015).
122. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL
3806492, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012).
123. See Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166. In arguing that laches should not bar
legal claims within the statute of limitations, tribes have relied on Petrella v. MGM, Inc., 572
U.S. 663, 667-68 (2014), which held that laches did not bar a copyright claim brought within
the statute of limitations set in the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 3-15,
Shinnecock, 628 F. App’x 54 (No. 14-4445(L)), 2015 WL 3901820. The Second Circuit has
rejected this argument primarily because it believes Congress has not established a statute of
limitations for tribal land claims. See, e.g., Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166. But see
infra note 274 (noting the unsettled question of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2415 set a statute of
limitations for tribal land claims). However, the Second Circuit has also stated that, even if
there were a statute of limitations, Petrella would not apply because Sherrill did not utilize
traditional laches. See id.; see also Shinnecock, 628 F. App’x at 55 (holding that
Stockbridge-Munsee foreclosed the tribe’s argument that Petrella abrogated Cayuga and
County of Oneida).
124. See, e.g., Onondaga, 2010 WL 3806492, at *5; Fort, supra note 113, at 380; supra
text accompanying notes 106-07 (explaining the Second Circuit’s rationale in Cayuga for
applying Sherrill to bar actions at law).
125. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)
(barring the tribe’s possessory land claims regardless of whether it sought “actual ejectment,
damages for ongoing trespass liability, or, instead, payment of the fair market value of the
property in a single lump sum”).
126. Onondaga, 2010 WL 3806492, at *7; accord Onondaga, 500 F. App’x at 89 (“The
disruptive nature of the claims is indisputable as a matter of law. . . . [A] declaratory
judgment alone—even without a contemporaneous request for an ejectment—would be
disruptive.”).
127. See Kathryn Fort, Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the
Unfortunate Resolution of the Modern Iroquois Land Claims, 11 WYO. L. REV. 375, 400
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require the dispute to concern a significant amount of land or number of
landowners because “the test for disruptiveness is not based on strict
numeric calculations” and Sherrill itself involved only small parcels of
land.128
The Second Circuit has held that its inherent disruption rule applies
against the United States in addition to tribes. Although laches traditionally
does not bar the United States’ claims, the court in Cayuga noted that this
was not a per se rule.129 It adopted from the Seventh Circuit three contexts
where laches could bar the United States’ claims: “egregious instances of
laches,” claims with no statute of limitations, and suits to enforce private
rights.130 The Cayuga court found all three exceptions applicable because
the United States did not bring suit for two hundred years, there was no
statute of limitations for the claim until 1966, and the United States sued on
behalf of the tribe.131 Five years later, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that the
intervention of the United States does not prevent application of the
inherent disruption rule.132

(2011) (noting that the Second Circuit’s doctrine “combines the disruption and impossibility
considerations from cases where ejectment or dispossession is a highly unlikely, but a
possible remedy, and applies them to any remedy conceived of by the tribes or district courts
for the illegal takings of tribal lands”).
128. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL
3501099, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006), aff’d, 628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015); accord
Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2012 WL
8503274, at *11 n.21 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012), report and recommendation adopted in
part and rejected in part, 2013 WL 3992830 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013).
129. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)).
130. See id. at 278-79 (citing United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.
1995)).
131. See id. at 279. Judge Hall also dissented from this part of the panel opinion. See id.
at 286-88 (Hall, J., dissenting). She argued that Clearfield Trust, which the majority cited for
its contention that there is no categorical bar on subjecting the United States to laches, only
applied laches against the United States since there was no statute of limitations and the
United States’ claims related to “business and commerce,” not its “sovereign authority and
rights.” Id. at 286-87. She then rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Administrative
Enterprises as based on a faulty reading of Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 287-88, 287
n.9. Finally, she argued that, even if the three exceptions from Administrative Enterprises
were legitimate, they did not apply to the United States’ intervention in the Cayuga land
claim litigation because the delay in bringing suit may have been reasonable, Congress had
set a statute of limitations, and the United States protects a public interest when it sues on a
tribe’s behalf. See id. at 288.
132. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 129 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Finally, the Second Circuit has not specified the length of delay and type
of disruption required to trigger the inherent disruption rule. As to the
former, all the claims the Second Circuit has adjudicated post-Sherrill arose
out of land transfers that occurred at least 130 years before suit was filed. 133
Sometimes, the court has not even relied on the specific length of the delay,
but instead only referred to the “tremendous expanse of time”134 or stated
that “the allegedly void transfers occurred long ago.”135 Because the OIN’s
delay in bringing suit in Sherrill was as long as the shortest period the
Second Circuit has considered, the court can easily say that the delays are
sufficiently long under Supreme Court precedent.136 For a unique claim in
one case, however, a district court held that a forty-year delay between the
allegedly invalid land transfer and the lawsuit was too short for Sherrill to
apply.137
The Second Circuit has been similarly vague about what level of
disruption to non-Indian settled expectations is required to trigger the
inherent disruption rule.138 In one case, the court simply said the area was
“extensively populated by non-Indians” and “predominantly non-Indian
today” with “significant material development by private persons and
enterprises as well as by public entities.”139 In another, the court noted that
tribal members “have not resided on the lands at issue since the nineteenth
century,” their “primary reservation lands are located elsewhere,” and “the
land has been owned and developed by other parties subject to State and

133. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2014)
(144 years); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (183 years);
Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 269 (174 years); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d
128, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (almost 130 years), aff’d in part and reversed in part sub nom.
County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Shinnecock, 2006 WL 3501099, at *5 (over
140 years).
134. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 126.
135. Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166.
136. Cf. Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (noting that it was bound by
Sherrill to find that the OIN’s delay in bringing suit was sufficiently long because the suit
involved the same underlying land claim).
137. See Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2013
WL 3992830, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013).
138. See id. at *18 (“[N]o bright-line rule exists such that an Indian population of less
than X percent establishes a non-Indian character and greater than X percent establishes an
Indian character . . . .”).
139. Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 3806492, at *8
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010)).
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local regulation.”140 Where the opinions have specified the size of the local
non-Indian population, it has always been over 99%.141 Courts have noted
as especially concerning tribal claims that would interfere with major
transportation routes142 and infrastructure developments.143 These cases all
represented straightforward applications of Sherrill, where the non-Indian
population was less than 1%, and the tribe owned less than 1.5% of the
land.144
2. Other Courts
Two courts outside the Second Circuit have adopted the inherent
disruption rule to dismiss tribal land claims.145 In New Jersey Sand Hill
140. Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166; see also County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 12627 (stating only that “most of the Oneidas have moved elsewhere, the subject lands have
passed into the hands of a multitude of entities and individuals . . . , and these parties have
themselves both bought and sold the lands, and also developed them to an enormous
extent”).
141. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL
3501099, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (stating that Suffolk County is 0.2% Indian), aff’d,
628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015); Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (noting that
Oneida and Madison Counties are 0.2% and 0.6% Indian, respectively).
142. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *5 (“Ejecting the state or otherwise
requiring that the highway be rerouted at this late date would be highly disruptive in
precisely the way Sherrill laches operates to prevent . . . .”); Shinnecock, 2006 WL 3501099,
at *5 n.9 (“[E]jecting the Long Island Railroad Company from the Subject Lands would
have devastating consequences to the region's economy and a drastic impact on thousands of
commuters.”).
143. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *9 (dismissing a tribal land claim under
Sherrill in part because of “the presence of a major hydroelectric facility” on the disputed
land).
144. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211 (2005).
145. Two other courts have also touched on Sherrill’s application to tribal land claims,
but they did not decide the issue. In Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of Los Angeles, an
Eastern District of California court seemed willing to apply Sherrill to a tribal land claim
seeking ejection of current owners from land to which the Tribe alleged it did not lawfully
surrender its title in 1938, but it refused to do so on the pleadings since “the issue of laches
raises significant questions of fact” and Sherrill itself was decided on summary judgment.
See No. 1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 521403, at *2, *4, *11 & n.4 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2011). As the court issued this
decision before the Second Circuit made explicit that its rule applied at the pleadings stage,
it is not clear whether it was affirmatively disagreeing with the Second Circuit on this issue.
Because the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Tribe’s complaint under Rule 19 for failing to join
the United States as an indispensable party, see Paiute-Shoshone, 637 F.3d at 995-96, and
the Tribe voluntarily dismissed its amended complaint attempting to do so, see Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 2, Paiute-Shoshone, No. 1:06-cv-00736 (E.D. Cal.
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Band of Lenape & Cherokee Indians v. Corzine, for example, a New Jersey
district court dismissed a tribal claim that New Jersey and its counties
“ha[d] converted and misappropriated their land and other property rights
for more than 200 years.”146 Similarly, in Wolfchild v. Redwood County, a
Minnesota district court dismissed a suit on behalf of a class of Indians
seeking recognition and possession of a twelve-square-mile reservation they
alleged Congress promised their ancestors for remaining loyal to the United
States during a Sioux uprising in the 1860s.147 In both cases, the court
emphasized the long delay of the tribe in bringing suit and the inherent risk
of disrupting non-Indian settled expectations.148 In Wolfchild, the court also
rejected an attempt to distinguish Sherrill on the grounds that the OIN’s
claim was based on aboriginal title and was equitable, not legal.149
One district court within the Second Circuit has attempted to mitigate the
harsh application of the inherent disruption rule, though seemingly in a way
incompatible with the Second Circuit’s guidance. In Canadian St. Regis
Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, Judge Kahn of the Northern District
of New York permitted two tribal claims to survive a motion for judgment
on the pleadings.150 Analyzing the suit separately for each type and section
Feb. 28, 2012), the court never ruled on the Sherrill issue. In Delaware Nation v.
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit declined to address Sherrill’s application to a tribal claim for
possession of 315 acres of land in Pennsylvania 250 years after the alleged dispossession.
446 F.3d 410, 413, 415 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). Because the court held that Pennsylvania had
extinguished the tribe’s aboriginal title with its 1737 land purchase and the Nonintercourse
Act did not bar the sale of land held by the tribal chief individually, the court did not reach
the defendants’ Sherrill argument. See id. at 415-19, 415 n.8.
146. No. 09-683 (KSG), 2010 WL 2674565, at *1 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010). The court
specifically applied Sherrill to bar claims based on a 1758 treaty, see id. at *20-21, after
dismissing many of the claims on other grounds, id. at *5-20.
147. See 91 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1095-98 (D. Minn. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 824
F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 447 (2016).
148. See id. at 1102-03, 1105 (noting that the tribal claim arose from an 1863 Act of
Congress and a land sale in 1895 and relying on Second Circuit caselaw to find that the
claim threatened the expectations of the local municipalities and individual property
owners); Sand Hill, 2010 WL 2674565, at *21 (stating that “the plaintiffs [sought]
possessory redress for an alleged contractual violation that ripened, at the latest, 208 years
ago” and that “[t]he grant of such relief would be disruptive to say the least” because “much
has happened in the interim”).
149. See Wolfchild, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 1105.
150. See Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2013
WL 3992830, at *8-21 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013). Interestingly, in Onondaga and
Stockbridge-Munsee, Judge Kahn held that the inherent disruption rule completely barred the
tribal suits. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, No. 3:86-CV-1140 (LEK/DEP),
2013 WL 3822093, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), aff’d, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014);
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of land the Tribe claimed,151 he first declined to find that a claim concerning
rights-of-way for power-line easements was barred, as only forty years had
passed between the signing of the argument and the tribal lawsuit.152
Second, he permitted the Tribe to pursue its claim for a two-thousand-acre
triangle sandwiched by its reservation on two sides.153 He noted that,
although the claim was over a century old and disruptive, the area did not
have a “longstanding distinctly non-Indian character.”154 He emphasized
that the triangle had a “large majority of Indian inhabitants” and a “much
higher concentration of Indian inhabitants than the surrounding region.”155
Further, more Mohawks remained in New York in the 1800s than Cayugas
and Oneidas.156 In reaching his holding, Judge Kahn relied heavily on the
fairness considerations of equity and noted that it would be “disturbingly
anti-democratic” to read Sherrill and its progeny to bar all tribal land claims
because Congress has itself set a statute of limitations.157

Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 3806492, at *7-8
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012). The Mohawk land claim’s
unique facts likely permitted him to distinguish the case from Cayuga and County of Oneida
in a way that the Onondaga and Stockbridge-Munsee land claims did not.
151. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *3-4 (justifying this analysis by noting
that, unlike Sherrill, Cayuga, County of Oneida, and Onondaga, the Mohawk claims
involved rights-of-way, international borders, and land carved out from its reservation in
different treaties). This approach seems inconsistent with Sherrill, which did not
differentiate among the OIN’s patchwork of land parcels. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211-21 (2005). Judge Kahn noted that Sherrill involved
concerns about checkerboarding jurisdiction and constantly changing parcels as the OIN
purchased new land, in contrast to the “easily identifiable and discrete areas” at issue with
the Mohawk claims. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *4. Although he has a point,
the Sherrill Court could have, but did not, fashion a test that considered each parcel’s
disruption separately. But see infra note 317 (arguing that the Court should alter the Sherrill
framework to permit more individualized and fact-specific analyses of disruption).
152. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *6-8.
153. See id. at *15-20.
154. See id. at *16-17.
155. See id. at *19.
156. Id. at *19-20.
157. See id. at *3, *16 & n.24. The Second Circuit would likely take issue with this
because it has held that Sherrill created a unique defense not tied to traditional equitable
concerns, see supra text accompanying note 119, and that the Indian Claims Limitation Act
did not set a statute of limitations for tribal land claims, see supra note 123.
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B. Sovereignty
1. Casino Disputes in New York
Sherrill’s most direct application has come in two cases in the Northern
District of New York that, like Sherrill, involved tribal attempts to secure
immunity from local laws for activities on repurchased lands within their
historic reservations. In these cases, the tribes attempted to construct class
II gaming facilities in violation of local zoning laws.158 Relying on Sherrill,
both judges ruled against the tribes in terse fashion.159 If tax immunity was
disruptive in Sherrill, the judges reasoned, immunity from zoning laws was
“even more disruptive.”160 More damning to the tribes, Sherrill explicitly
mentioned concerns about disruption from zoning law immunity and cited
these two cases as examples.161 The judges concluded that the “Supreme
Court’s strong language in City of Sherrill regarding the disruptive effect on
the everyday administration of state and local governments bar[red] the
Nation from asserting immunity from state and local zoning laws and
regulations.”162
The Eastern District of New York found Sherrill applicable in a different
casino zoning dispute involving the Shinnecocks. Before the Second Circuit
vacated the decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court
conducted a detailed Sherrill analysis after a thirty-day bench trial. The
district court concluded that Sherrill barred construction of a casino on
tribal nontrust land in violation of state and local laws.163 The court made
158. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Village of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205
(N.D.N.Y. 2005); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Town of Aurelius, No. 5:03-CV-00690 (NPM),
2004 WL 1945359, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004).
159. See Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (granting summary judgment to the
Village and vacating the tribe’s permanent injunction); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Town of
Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. 278, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting the Town judgment on the
pleadings).
160. Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206; accord Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. at 281.
161. Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206; accord Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. at 281; see also
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 220 (2005) (noting that if it ruled for
the OIN, “little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new generation of litigation to free
the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all landowners in the
area”); id. at 220 n.13 (referring to the attempts of the tribes in Aurelius and Union Springs
“to free historic reservation lands purchased in the open market from local regulatory
controls”).
162. See Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206; accord Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. at 282.
163. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 188, 195-96, 27991 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 686 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2012).
The opinion is not clear on the ownership history of the land, but the court suggested that,
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three preliminary rulings on Sherrill’s applicability. First, even though the
Tribe possessed the land continuously, unlike the OIN in Sherrill, Cayuga
required the court to apply Sherrill to any disruptive land claim.164 Second,
because Sherrill and Cayuga “analyzed . . . potential future disruptiveness
that would result from a decision in favor of the tribe,” the state could
introduce evidence of possible uses for the land beyond the proposed
casino.165 The court emphasized that it would waste judicial resources to
require the state to seek an injunction each time the Tribe conducted a
slightly more disruptive activity.166 Third, since recognizing the Tribe’s
sovereignty would permit it to ignore state law, the court rejected the
argument that it should consider in its disruption analysis the Tribe’s
agreement to build its casino in accordance with state environmental
laws.167
The court then held that Sherrill barred the Tribe from asserting
sovereignty over the land to secure an exemption from state and local
zoning laws.168 The court noted that the Tribe had not previously asserted
sovereignty on the land and utilized it only “for timber and periodic social
gatherings.”169 The court also recognized that, although the town never
imposed property taxes, it had exercised jurisdiction in other ways for
centuries without objection from the Tribe.170 Finally, relying on substantial
factual evidence and expert testimony, the court found that the construction
although the tribe ceded title to the land to colonists in the 1600s, it retained possession
continuously through the present. See id. at 280.
164. See id. at 280-81.
165. See id. at 281-83. The court noted, however, that even the proposed casino was
sufficiently disruptive that Sherrill compelled a ruling for the state. See id. at 283.
166. See id. at 288.
167. See id. at 287. The court also held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did not
authorize the casino because the tribe was not federally recognized at the time. See id. at
293; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (2012) (requiring a tribe be federally recognized to fall
within IGRA’s scope). This provided an independent basis for the court’s holding, see
Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 294 (finding that IGRA preempted any common law right for
the tribe to engage in gaming), but it also meant that the Tribe would not have to sign a
tribal-state compact if the court had recognized its right to build a casino.
168. See Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 283-91.
169. Id. at 283-84 (citing a lack of permanent structures or fencing on the land; a lack of
tribal laws for use of the land; an archeological study finding “minimal human activity” on
the land; and the Tribe’s failure to protest encroachment by a non-Indian neighboring
landowner).
170. See id. at 284-85 (noting inclusion of the land in a 1738 subdivision; the town’s
regulation of timber harvesting and improvement of a public road on the land; and its 1957
zoning ordinance that included the land).
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and operation of the casino would disrupt state and local governance, as
well as the settled expectations of non-Indian landowners.171 Of most
concern were the burdens of providing police, fire, ambulance, water, and
other services to the casino; the increased traffic and accompanying safety
hazards; and the health and environmental consequences of construction.172
2. Reservation Diminishment
Beyond these New York casino disputes, courts have wrestled with
whether and how to apply Sherrill to sovereignty claims primarily in
reservation diminishment cases where a party has argued that Congress
shrunk or eliminated a reservation. No court has relied on Sherrill
exclusively to find a reservation diminished or to deny a tribe the ability to
exercise sovereignty over its reservation, but some have suggested they
would do so in an appropriate case.173
Both the Second Circuit and the Northern District of New York have
repeatedly held that Sherrill did not disturb the Second Circuit’s holding
that the Oneida reservation has not been disestablished.174 They have

171. See id. at 285-91.
172. See id. at 285-87. In a separate sovereignty question that emerged in a New York
casino dispute, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that Sherrill made the land-to-trust
process of the IRA “the sole means for a tribe to establish jurisdiction over off-reservation
fee lands.” Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cty. v. Chaudhuri, 802 F.3d 267, 284
n.14 (2d Cir. 2015). The court noted correctly that, while Sherrill endorsed the IRA process,
it “did not state that this was the only avenue” to do so. Id.; see also City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005) (“[The IRA] provides the proper avenue for
OIN to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years
ago.”). Thus, Congress can provide a tribe-specific statutory scheme to effectuate the same
purpose. See Citizens Against Casino Gambling, 802 F.3d at 284 n.14 (noting that the
Seneca Nation Settlement Act “provided a mechanism comparable to the IRA through which
the Seneca Nation could attain jurisdiction” over newly purchased lands and thus that the
Tribe did not “unilaterally assert jurisdiction” over their land like the OIN did in Sherrill).
173. In a case not described below, the Eighth Circuit denied South Dakota’s motion to
amend its petition for rehearing to include a Sherrill argument after rejecting its reservation
diminishment claim. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 985, 992-93 (8th
Cir. 2010).
174. See, e.g., Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556, 563 (2d
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-1320, 2017 WL 5660979 (Nov. 27, 2017); Oneida Indian
Nation v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2011); Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus.
Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 6:08-CV-0660 (LEK/DEP), 2015 WL 1400384, at *12 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2015), aff’d 673 F. App’x 63 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017);
Town of Verona v. Jewell, No. 6:08-cv-0647 (LEK/DEP), 2015 WL 1400291, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015); Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-660
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emphasized that Sherrill explicitly declined to address the disestablishment
question175 and that the decision recognized that only Congress can
disestablish a reservation.176 They further rejected the argument that the
OIN reservation must be disestablished simply because “sovereignty is a
distinguishing characteristic of an Indian reservation” and Sherrill denied
the OIN the ability to exercise sovereignty over the land.177
Similarly, the Eastern District of Michigan has taken a strong stance
against reliance on Sherrill in reservation diminishment cases.178 In
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, a tribal-state jurisdictional
dispute, the court articulated three reasons for its position that Sherrill did
not affect reservation diminishment cases.179 First, “the challenged conduct
[was] not the same sort of distinct ancient wrong arising from the early days
of the Republic,” as was found in Sherrill or Cayuga, because the
reservation diminishment dispute concerned the state’s “incremental
assumption of governmental responsibilities” over the reservation since
treaties were signed.180 Second, while Sherrill and Cayuga involved
Nonintercourse Act violations with no statutorily defined remedy, the suit
here arose from a treaty violation, a remedy which does not require the
same exercise of judicial discretion.181 Third, the Tribe stipulated it was not
seeking property tax exemptions, the ability to govern nonmembers, or the
“resurrection of an ancient claim to the land” like those at issue in Sherrill
and Cayuga; instead, it merely sought to exercise its treaty right to selfgovernance.182 The court recognized that the United States had intervened
(LEK/DEP), 2010 WL 786526, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010); New York v. Salazar,
No. 6:08-CV-644 (LEK/GJD), 2009 WL 3165591, at *8-9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).
175. See, e.g., Madison County, 665 F.3d at 443; Salazar, 2009 WL 3165591, at *9.
176. See, e.g., Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n, 2010 WL 786526, at *11.
177. See Town of Verona v. Salazar, No. 6:08-cv-647 (LEK/GJD), 2009 WL 3165556, at
*6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d 556, cert. denied,
No. 16-1320, 2017 WL 5660979 (Nov. 27, 2017). In a case involving the Cayugas, the New
York Court of Appeals agreed that Sherrill said nothing about reservation diminishment. See
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 247-49 (N.Y. 2010).
178. Without much explanation, a judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin appeared to
agree with the Eastern District of Michigan. See Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, No. 16C-1217, 2017 WL 4773299, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 2017) (noting that, unless the town
could show that Congress had diminished the reservation, Cabazon, not Sherrill, governed
whether its special events ordinance applied to tribal activities).
179. See No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 4808823, at *1-2, *22-23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22,
2008).
180. Id. at *22.
181. See id.
182. Id.
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in its sovereign capacity to enforce its treaties with the Tribe and that
equitable doctrines cannot alter treaty obligations.183 In ruling for the Tribe,
the court declined to read Sherrill and Cayuga for the broad proposition that
“Indian tribes are barred by equitable defenses when they request
prospective relief contrary to contemporary ‘justifiable expectations’ of a
non-Indian population—public and private.”184
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that Sherrill might apply to
reservation diminishment claims. In Osage Nation v. Irby, a dispute
concerning state tax authority, the court used the established Solem test for
reservation diminishment to affirm the district court’s holding that
Congress had diminished a reservation in Osage County.185 The district
court had also ruled for the state on its Sherrill argument. Due to the state’s
governance of the county for over one hundred years, the population
makeup containing merely 20.7% Indian and 5.4% Osage, and the Tribe’s
delayed challenge to the state’s tax authority, the district court thought that
“[r]ecognizing Osage County as a reservation and ousting Oklahoma
income taxation over Osage members would have significant practical
consequences not only for income taxation, but potentially for civil,
criminal and regulatory jurisdiction.”186 The Tenth Circuit panel did not
review this Sherrill holding, but it did suggest that “‘the longstanding
183. See id. at *23 (“It would be remarkable to hold that the commitments and
obligations of the United States embodied in its treaties may be altered by a judicially
endorsed equitable defense based upon the State of Michigan’s inconsistent incremental
exercise of governmental authority over time.”).
184. Id. at *17 (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 215
(2005)).
185. 597 F.3d 1117, 1121-27 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’g sub nom. Osage Nation v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Okla. 2009). The Solem test asks
whether Congress intended to diminish the reservation by looking at the statutory language
of Congress’s enactment, its legislative history, and post-enactment history. See COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04(3), at 199 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2012).
186. Osage, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1265-66, 1266 n.15. The court put significant weight on
the state’s need to collect taxes to provide services to the County and its residents:
The ability to raise revenues to support its services to Osage County lands and
the tax status of Osage tribal members is of critical importance to Oklahoma. If
this Court were to now establish Osage County as a reservation more than a
century after Congress was understood to have dissolved that status and that
such status automatically deprives Oklahoma of the ability to fund services in
Osage County through income taxes, the State's provision of services would be
severely threatened.
Id. at 1265.
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assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is [predominantly]
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, may create justifiable
expectations’ that ‘merit heavy weight.’”187 The import of this statement is
unclear. The panel might have thought Sherrill was either an alternative
means of finding reservation diminishment or instead a doctrine limiting
relief after finding a reservation undiminished.188 Although it may not have
been intentional, the district court’s language about the disruption from
“establishing Osage County as a reservation” suggests that it believed the
former.189
Six years later, however, in Ute Indian Tribe v. Myton, the Tenth Circuit
refused to apply Sherrill to bar a tribal suit enjoining a town from
exercising criminal jurisdiction on a reservation on the basis that the Tribe’s
long delay in bringing suit induced the town to reasonably believe that it
did not contain reservation lands.190 The panel questioned whether Sherrill
could apply to a suit involving tribal trust lands because the United States is
generally not subject to laches.191 It also doubted that the town’s belief was
justified because the federal government told it in 1945 that the Tribe had
jurisdiction within its boundaries, the Tribe consistently objected after the
town asserted jurisdiction over the lands, the Tribe won two judgments
holding that all or some of the town was Indian Country, and the state and
county accepted tribal jurisdiction.192 The court contrasted this with
Sherrill, “where the land was sold to nontribal members and neither the
tribe nor the federal government did anything to assert their rights ‘[f]rom
the early 1800’s into the 1970’s.’”193 The panel did not say whether it
would have followed the Sherrill-related concerns its colleagues had
187. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1127-28 (alteration in original) (quoting Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 21516).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 284-86 (discussing the conceptual distinction
between these two issues).
189. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1120. An Oklahoma state court has also relied on Sherrill as one of
multiple reasons to find that land was not Indian Country. See Murphy v. State, 124 P.3d
1198, 1206 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that a road was not Indian Country for the
purposes of criminal jurisdiction where the only Indian ownership interest was a one-twelfth
stake in the mineral rights beneath the land in part because considering it Indian Country
would create the checkerboard of state and tribal jurisdiction the Court found problematic in
Sherrill).
190. See 835 F.3d 1255, 1258-60, 1263 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 2328
(2017). An earlier iteration of this case reached the Supreme Court in Hagen v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399 (1994).
191. See Ute, 835 F.3d at 1263.
192. See id.
193. See id. (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005)).
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expressed in Osage if it were less skeptical of the alleged justifiable
expectations of the town.
Eschewing either position, the Western District of Michigan has held
that Sherrill applies only to the remedial stage of a reservation
diminishment suit. In Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v.
Snyder, the court bifurcated the case because the Tribe sought two forms of
relief: a declaration that its reservation had not been diminished and a
permanent injunction barring the state from asserting jurisdiction over the
Tribe or its citizens in a manner inconsistent with federal law.194 The first
stage would cover the question of reservation diminishment; because this
question depended solely on congressional intent, the court awarded the
Tribe summary judgment on the state’s Sherrill defense for this issue.195
However, if Congress had not diminished the reservation, the court
concluded that Sherrill and its focus on remedies could be relevant in the
second stage to determine whether to enjoin the state from asserting
jurisdiction on the reservation and what state activities to enjoin.196 Since
the resolution depended on the specific equitable relief the Tribe would
seek, the court declined at that point to adjudicate Sherrill’s application to
this second stage.197
3. Hunting and Fishing Treaty Rights
Two courts have taken opposite positions on Sherrill’s application to
treaty-based hunting and fishing rights disputes. In United States v.
Washington, the Ninth Circuit held that Sherrill did not alter the
longstanding rule that laches cannot diminish or render unenforceable tribal
treaty rights.198 The State of Washington had appealed an injunction
194. See 194 F. Supp. 3d 648, 650 (W.D. Mich. 2016).
195. See id. at 653-54.
196. See id. at 654-55.
197. See id. at 655. The court noted as an example that Sherrill would not bar an
injunction preventing the state from interfering in Indian child custody cases; it did not
explain why, but its citation to the Indian Child Welfare Act suggests it believed equitable
defenses could not interfere with the congressional grant of tribal jurisdiction over such
matters. See id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012)).
198. See 853 F.3d 946, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S.
Ct. 1832 (2018). In a subproceeding of the same action, the district court also declined to
apply Sherrill to an intertribal dispute about the boundaries of their fishing areas because it
involved a delay of no more than thirty-five years, during which the tribes negotiated an
informal settlement, and because their failure to resolve their claims during the lengthy
litigation meant their expectations were neither settled nor justifiable. See United States v.
Washington, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206, 1211-13 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
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requiring it to remove culverts it built that prevented fish from moving
freely to and from their spawning grounds in violation of tribal fishing
rights.199 Washington contended that Sherrill’s equitable considerations
permitted the court to find that the United States waived its treaty claims
because it helped the state prepare a fish remediation plan and ordered
specifically designed culverts on federally funded highways.200 The court
rejected this argument by distinguishing Sherrill in three ways. First,
Sherrill involved a claim to sovereignty over land within an abandoned
reservation; the Tribes in Washington had not abandoned their
reservations.201 Second, unlike in Sherrill, the Tribes had not relinquished
their treaty rights in any way.202 Third, Washington and the Tribes had
fought over fishing rights for more than a century, whereas the dispute in
Sherrill lay dormant for almost two centuries.203
The Northern District of Ohio implicitly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit
in its ruling on laches in a dispute over a tribe’s exercise of hunting and
fishing rights free from state regulation.204 On summary judgment, the court
analyzed the state’s defense using the traditional laches factors of
unreasonable delay and prejudice.205 The court first held that the delay
199. See Washington, 853 F.3d at 954.
200. See id. at 966-67.
201. Id. at 968.
202. See id.
203. See id.; see also United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2017)
(Fletcher, J., & Gould, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (reiterating the same
arguments), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018). This holding inspired
a strong dissent when the court declined to rehear the case en banc. See id. at 1030-31
(O’Scannlain, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). The dissent rejected these three
ways of distinguishing Sherrill. Since Sherrill clarified that laches can bar tribal treaty
rights, they thought it irrelevant that Sherrill involved sovereignty over land and this dispute
concerned rights appurtenant to land. See id. Nor did it matter that the Tribes had not
acquiesced to the culverts because Washington sought to impose laches against the United
States, whom Sherrill made subject to laches and who was an essential party to permit the
Tribes to sue a sovereign state. See id. at 1031 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 129 (2d Cir. 2010)). Finally, the United States delayed over thirty
years from completion of the culverts before bringing suit, which made removal difficult and
expensive. See id.
204. In dicta, the Eastern District of California has also stated that laches can apply to
tribal treaty rights post-Sherrill. See Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of Los Angeles,
No. 1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 521403, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007).
205. See Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 541 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (N.D. Ohio
2008), aff’d on other grounds, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009). Previously, the court declined
to resolve the Sherrill issue on a motion to dismiss because of the complicated factual
questions involved. See Ottawa Tribe v. Speck, 447 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844-45 (N.D. Ohio
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between the Tribe’s removal from Ohio in 1831 and its lawsuit in 2005 was
unreasonable.206 On the prejudice prong, the court found that permitting the
Tribe to hunt and fish free from state regulation on public lands and inland
waters would pose a threat of injury to state park visitors.207 Further, it
would harm wildlife refuges and hinder state conservation efforts.208 The
court thought tribal fishing in Lake Erie would not prejudice the state
because the lake was under-fished and the state could still regulate nonIndian fishing.209 The court declined to read Sherrill to hold that “enforcing
a treaty right which inhibits state sovereignty and creates a special
sovereign status for [the Tribe] is inherently prejudicial.”210 Instead, the
court distinguished the claim in Sherrill, which sought complete freedom
from state and local sovereign control, from the Ottawas’ claim for “partial
displacement of sovereign authority” over hunting and fishing rights.211
4. Sovereign Immunity
Finally, lower courts have disagreed over the implications of Sherrill for
tribal sovereign immunity. This issue arose on remand in the Sherrill
litigation in the Madison County decision. After the Court denied the OIN
tax immunity, the Tribe sought to enjoin Madison and Oneida Counties
from foreclosing on the parcels for nonpayment of taxes on the basis of its
sovereign immunity from suit.212 Rejecting the counties’ argument that
Sherrill barred the OIN from asserting sovereign immunity, the Second
Circuit emphasized the distinction between “tribal sovereign authority over
reservation lands and tribal sovereign immunity from suit.”213 While tax
immunity arises from tribal sovereign authority over specific lands,
sovereign immunity operates independently of the status of the land where

2006). The use of traditional laches and adjudication on summary judgment differ from the
Second Circuit’s treatment of Sherrill arguments in tribal land claims. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-15, 119-23.
206. See Ottawa, 541 F. Supp. 2d. at 976-77 (noting that the delay was unreasonable
despite the Tribe’s lack of financial resources because the Tribe could have sued in state
court since 1831 and federal court since at least 1966).
207. See id. at 978-79.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 979-80.
210. Id. at 979.
211. Id.
212. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2010),
vacated as moot and remanded, 562 U.S. 42 (2011).
213. Id. at 156.
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the relevant tribal activities occur.214 The two doctrines also developed
separately.215 The court declined to read Sherrill as implicitly abrogating
the sovereign immunity of the OIN simply to permit the counties to enforce
their tax laws.216 The court observed that our legal system regularly gives
rights without remedies and that the counties had other recourse, including
damages suits against tribal officers, agreements with the Tribe, and
congressional legislation.217
The Second Circuit reaffirmed this holding in a factually
indistinguishable suit by another New York tribe.218 Emphasizing these
holdings, the Supreme Court in 2014 reaffirmed the “solicitous treatment of
the common-law tribal immunity from suit—as opposed to immunity from
other, largely prescriptive, powers of the states such as the levying of
taxes.”219 The court reasoned that reading Sherrill to impliedly abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity would violate the Court’s admonition that only
Congress could do so.220
Not all courts have agreed with the Second Circuit. At least one has held
that tribes cannot invoke sovereign immunity where Sherrill bars immunity
from state and local laws.221 Other judges have expressed discomfort with
214. See id. at 156-58.
215. See id. (tracing sovereign authority to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), and sovereign immunity to Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919)).
216. See id. at 159 n.8, 160.
217. See id.
218. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2014) (per
curiam).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 221 (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014)).
New Mexico state courts have agreed with the Second Circuit for similar reasons. See
Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe, 388 P.3d 977, 987-88 (N.M. 2016); Armijo v.
Pueblo of Laguna, 247 P.3d 1119, 1123-24 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). A Connecticut state court
has also suggested that Sherrill said nothing about tribal sovereign immunity. See Van
Etten v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. KNLCV044001587, 2005 WL 3112753,
at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2005).
221. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 298 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (rejecting a tribe’s argument that sovereign immunity barred a suit by the state and
town to enjoin it from opening a casino), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 686 F.3d
133 (2d Cir. 2012). The Eastern District of Wisconsin arguably reached the same result in
Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Village of Hobart. See 542 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920-21 (E.D. Wis.
2008) (permitting the town to foreclose on property reacquired by a tribe and subject to state
and local taxes under Sherrill). Hobart did not explicitly discuss sovereign immunity, see
Armijo, 247 P.3d at 1124 (“[T]he basis for the decision in Hobart was sovereign authority
not sovereign immunity.”), but the court granted summary judgment permitting the town to
foreclose on tribal property. See Hobart, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 910. A third case, Poarch Band
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the binding caselaw that required them to rule for tribes on this issue.222 The
theory that Sherrill altered the law of tribal sovereign immunity rests on
two rationales. First, the Sherrill majority disagreed with the dissent’s
statement that the OIN could assert its tax immunity defensively in a
foreclosure action due to the majority’s focus on the equitable nature of the
relief, stating that “[t]he equitable cast of the relief sought remains the same
whether asserted affirmatively or defensively.”223 One court has interpreted
this to mean that tribes cannot assert sovereign immunity defensively when
Sherrill bars them from exercising sovereign authority affirmatively.224
Second, Sherrill’s holding that state and local laws apply on certain tribal
land is meaningless without the power to enforce those laws, so Sherrill
must have implicitly abrogated sovereign immunity. 225 Even two of the
of Creek Indians v. Moore, also appeared to read Sherrill as holding that the OIN could not
assert sovereign immunity in suits for nonpayment of taxes, but this reading may have
resulted from misunderstanding the distinction between sovereign immunity from taxation
and sovereign immunity from suit. See No. CA 15-00277-CG-C, 2016 WL 4778788, at *10
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 2016) (noting during its discussion of tribal immunity from the
defendant’s counterclaim that Sherrill held that the OIN “was barred from asserting
sovereign immunity from paying city property taxes”), report and recommendation adopted
in part and rejected in part, 2016 WL 4745185 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016). In any event, the
court declined to apply Sherrill because it thought laches, acquiescence, and impossibility
irrelevant to the dispute and because the counterclaim concerned trust land. See id. at *11.
222. See Madison County, 605 F.3d at 163-64 (Cabranes, J., concurring); Cayuga Indian
Nation v. Seneca County, 890 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246-47 (W.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 761 F.3d
218 (2d Cir. 2014).
223. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 214 n.7 (2005); see id. at
225-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 298. But see Hamaatsa, 388 P.3d at 987-88 (noting
and rejecting the argument that this language created an exception to tribal sovereign
immunity for equitable relief).
225. See Hobart, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 921; Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 298. In addition,
local governments have repeatedly contended that tribes cannot assert sovereign immunity in
foreclosure suits because they are in rem proceedings. See, e.g., Seneca County, 761 F.3d at
221; Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 2005),
aff’d, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated as moot and remanded, 562 U.S. 42 (2011).
Courts have rejected this argument because foreclosure proceedings are really “suit[s] to
take the tribe’s property,” Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 229, and sovereign immunity
is a broad doctrine with limited exceptions, Seneca County, 761 F.3d at 220-21. But see Cass
Cty. Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land in Highland Twp., 643 N.W.2d 685, 694
(N.D. 2002) (rejecting the argument that the court could not adjudicate an in rem
condemnation action over tribal fee land); Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d
569, 573-74 (Wash. 2017) (same in an in rem quiet title suit), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1649
(2018). This past term, the Supreme Court ruled that County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), did not hold that Indian tribes lack
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three judges on the Madison County panel, although bound by Supreme
Court precedent, felt it “defie[d] common sense” that a “tribe [could]
purchase land . . . ; refuse to pay lawfully-owed taxes; and suffer no
consequences because the taxing authority cannot sue to collect the taxes
owed.”226
III. Toward a Faithful Understanding of Sherrill
As is evident from the preceding discussion, courts are in a state of
confusion over the effect of the Sherrill decision. With significant dissent,
the Second Circuit has interpreted Sherrill to bar all tribal land claims. The
Tenth Circuit and the Western District of Michigan have suggested that
Sherrill may apply to reservation diminishment cases, but the Second
Circuit and the Eastern District of Michigan have held it does not. Courts
are also split on whether Sherrill permits laches to apply in disputes
concerning tribal hunting and fishing rights. Most, but not all, courts have
declined to find that Sherrill altered the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.
Transcending these doctrinal areas are other conflicts about Sherrill’s
application, such as whether its framework can apply at the pleadings stage,
whether it requires evidentiary findings, whether the United States is
subject to arguments based on Sherrill, and whether Sherrill is a new
equitable defense or merely a version of traditional laches.
All this confusion has likely arisen because Sherrill does not fit neatly
within any preexisting doctrinal category. The Court drew on a number of
different doctrines to support the decision, but it acknowledged that none of
them directly governed the OIN suit for tax immunity.227 Although Sherrill

sovereign immunity in in rem proceedings, but it declined to address whether the commonlaw immovable property exception applies to tribal sovereign immunity. See 138 S. Ct. at
1653-54.
226. Madison County, 605 F.3d at 163-64 (Cabranes, J., concurring). The Northern
District of Oklahoma rejected an argument that Sherrill could deprive tribes of another
aspect of sovereignty: the ability to bring parens patriae suits on behalf of their members.
See Quapaw Tribe v. Blue Tree Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175, 1190-92 (N.D. Okla.
2009). Unlike Sherrill, which involved a tribal attempt to displace state and local
jurisdiction, the court reasoned that the tribe in this suit brought claims under state law to
abate environmental hazards on land over which it exercised sovereign authority. See id. at
1192.
227. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215 (noting that the Court has expressed concerns about
non-Indian expectations “in the different, but related, context of the diminishment of an
Indian reservation”); id. at 217 (“The principle that the passage of time can preclude relief
has deep roots in our law, and this Court has recognized this prescription in various
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involved tax immunity, for example, the Court did not mention its
precedents on the topic. The decision affected the ability of the OIN to
exercise sovereignty on its reservation pursuant to its treaty with the United
States, but the Court did not apply traditional reservation diminishment or
treaty rights analysis. Nor does the case fit with traditional land claim
litigation because the OIN was not seeking ejectment or damages for its
dispossessed land.
Furthermore, Sherrill’s imprecise language leaves the decision
susceptible to broad application. The Sherrill Court clearly expressed
concerns about the delay of the OIN in bringing suit and the settled
expectations of non-Indian landowners and state and local governments that
the reassertion of tribal sovereignty would disrupt.228 These concerns could
arise in practically any dispute involving Indian tribes. Because tribes fall
outside the two-sovereign federalist structure that dominates the American
perspective about government,229 most non-Indians probably do not think
about tribes regularly and would be surprised if a tribe sought to exercise
land, treaty, or sovereign rights in their neighborhoods.
A broad application of Sherrill’s concerns about justifiable expectations
and disruption could bar any tribal attempt to exercise its rights in a new
way or in a way that it has not done for some time. For example, as the
Northern District of Ohio has suggested, a tribe’s attempt to exercise
hunting and fishing treaty rights after many years of not doing so could
interfere with the expectations of non-Indians who are using those lands
and waters. The exercise of these rights could also interfere with the ability
of state and local governments to implement conservation measures.230
Similarly, construction of a casino could cause disruption to the
expectations of non-Indian neighbors about traffic and noise while
hindering state and local efforts to maintain zoning and environmental
standards.231 The varied contexts in which these concerns could apply make
the Sherrill Court’s failure to specify the limits of its holding

guises.”); id. at 218 (“This Court’s original-jurisdiction state-sovereignty cases do not dictate
a result here, but they provide a helpful point of reference . . . .”).
228. See Fort, supra note 113, at 380 (noting that Sherrill’s “new laches” doctrine differs
from traditional laches in part because it focuses on “delay and disruption”).
229. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that tribes cannot exercise sovereignty over those who do not consent to
their jurisdiction because they fall outside the Constitution’s two-sovereign structure).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 162-72.
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problematic.232 Therefore, the first step in making sense of how lower
courts should apply Sherrill is to figure out what Sherrill stood for. The
lack of doctrinal rigor in the decision makes this task difficult, but the Court
provided four significant hints about the scope of the decision.
First, the Court explicitly said that Sherrill did not alter the Court’s 1985
holding in Oneida II, which permits tribes to sue for damages under federal
common law for the unlawful dispossession of their land.233 True, Oneida II
expressly left open the question of whether laches barred the Tribe’s
possessory land claim.234 But Oneida II also reserved the question of
“whether equitable considerations should limit the relief available” to the
Tribe.235 The Sherrill opinion plainly addressed only the latter question
concerning remedies.236 It twice mentioned that Oneida II reserved this
question, including at the beginning of its legal analysis, and omitted any
mention of the laches question.237 The Court strongly hinted in both Oneida
II and Sherrill that applying equitable doctrines to bar suits for damages
would be inappropriate,238 which suggests that Sherrill’s equitable concerns
do not apply to the Oneida II federal common law right. The Court’s
reaffirmance of Oneida II requires that Sherrill’s scope be understood in
light of the common law cause of action for unlawful dispossession.
Second, although hardly clear, Sherrill is a land claim case, not one
primarily about sovereignty. In subsequent sovereignty disputes, litigants
hoping to apply Sherrill have repeatedly argued that the decision concerned

232. The fact that the Court created the Sherrill doctrine without briefing from the parties
and amici on the specific issue it ultimately decided may partially explain its failure to
anticipate and limit the consequences of this new doctrine. See supra note 54.
233. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005).
234. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2005); see also
Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1985) (refusing to rule on the petitioners’ laches argument
because they did not raise it at the Second Circuit).
235. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 253 n.27.
236. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 209, 213.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 221 n.14 (“[A]pplication of a nonstatutory time limitation in an action for
damages would be ‘novel.’” (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244 n.16)); Oneida II, 470 U.S.
at 244 n.16 (suggesting, but not deciding, that laches would not bar the OIN’s claim for
damages because laches do not apply to actions at law or fit with Indians’ ward status,
federal policy supporting tribal land claims, and the requirement of a congressional act to
extinguish tribal sovereignty); cf. Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 290 (Hall, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (relying on these statements from Sherrill and Oneida II to argue that
“Sherrill limits the application of the equitable defense of laches to the award of forwardlooking, disruptive equitable relief”).
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sovereignty and treaty rights.239 In support of this argument, Justice Scalia
suggested at the Parker oral argument that Sherrill held that the OIN did
not have sovereignty over their repurchased parcels.240 Tribes and the
federal government have responded by arguing that Sherrill has no
application to most sovereignty disputes because it concerned a remedy for
the unlawful dispossession of the OIN land.241
The Sherrill decision does not explicitly resolve this debate, but a close
reading demonstrates the tribes are correct. At Sherrill’s core is a concern
about whether a revival of tribal sovereignty is an appropriate remedy for
the Oneida II common law right of action.242 This is clear from the
beginning of the opinion’s legal analysis, where the Court acknowledged
the Oneida II right and then stated that the Tribe could not reassert tax
immunity as a remedy for this violation.243 The Court reiterated throughout
Sherrill that it was addressing a remedy for the Oneida II right.244 While the
OIN sought to assert sovereignty on its reservation, the underlying right
concerned New York’s unlawful dispossession of tribal lands. The Court’s
repeated references to the “ancient” wrong reinforce this conclusion;245 only
the unlawful dispossession occurring in the late 1700s and early 1800s, and
not the sovereignty dispute arising in the late 1990s, could be considered an
239. See, e.g., Brief of Oklahoma Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance at 21-22, Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5050);
Brief of Defendant-Appellee Director of Ohio Department of Natural Resources at 37-38,
Ottawa Tribe v. Logan, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3621), 2008 WL 6123204;
State’s Brief in Opposition to Tribe’s Combined Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Defenses or Rule 26(b) Limit Discovery at 15-16, Little
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Snyder, 194 F. Supp. 3d 648 (W.D. Mich. 2016)
(No. 1:15-cv-850).
240. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016)
(No. 14-1406), 2016 WL 524813.
241. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellant at 53, Osage, 597 F.3d 1117 (No. 09-5050),
2009 WL 2429151; Reply Brief of Appellant Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma at 26, Ottawa
Tribe v. Logan, 577 F.3d 634 (No. 08-3621), 2009 WL 1420918.
242. But see Singel & Fletcher, supra note 87, at 46 (suggesting that Sherrill was not a
land case, at least not in the same way as Oneida I and Oneida II).
243. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14.
244. See, e.g., id. at 202 (“Our 1985 decision recognized that the Oneidas could maintain
a federal common-law claim for damages for ancient wrongdoing in which both national and
state governments were complicit. Today, we decline to protect redress for the Tribe into the
present and future . . . .”); id. at 221 (“[T]he question of damages for the Tribe’s ancient
dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in
Oneida II. However, [the facts of the case] render inequitable the piecemeal shift in
governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.”).
245. E.g., id. at 216 n.11, 221.
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“ancient” wrong.246 The Court also relied most directly on two cases
involving Indian land claims: Felix v. Patrick and Yankton Sioux Tribe of
Indians v. United States.247 Finally, Sherrill’s application of equitable
defenses fits much better in the context of a remedy for the Oneida II right
rather than a sovereignty or treaty violation. It would be radical to apply
equitable defenses to bar an Indian treaty right, which only Congress can
abrogate.248 The Court is free, however, to craft defenses to a common law
right of action.249
Third, Sherrill’s analysis centered on the distinction between rights and
remedies. The Court explicitly recognized this distinction250 and stressed
that equitable considerations barred only the specific relief the OIN sought,
not its entire claim.251 This focus on remedies follows from the
reaffirmance of Oneida II and the emphasis on the underlying land claim.
246. Cf. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL
4808823, at *22 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008) (distinguishing a reservation diminishment
dispute from Sherrill in part by noting that, while Sherrill concerned an ancient wrong from
over two centuries earlier, the dispute at issue developed incrementally with the state’s
assumption of jurisdiction); Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 12 (noting two
timeframes for the claim in Sherrill: a long-standing dispute with New York from the 1700s
and a new dispute arising when the OIN first repurchased its land).
247. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-19; see also Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 272 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1926) (involving a tribe’s suit over title and possession to a
tract of land in Minnesota); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 318-19 (1892) (involving a tribal
member’s heirs’ suit to establish a constructive trust over lands allegedly fraudulently
conveyed to the defendants).
248. See infra text accompanying note 287.
249. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 240-50, 253 n.27 (1985) (rejecting the relevance
of a number of defenses to the common law right of action for unlawful dispossession and
reserving the question of whether equitable defenses could bar certain forms of relief). In
Saginaw Chippewa, the court noted that the Sherrill Court was “reasonably, indeed
necessarily, involved in the task of fashioning a remedy” for a Nonintercourse Act violation
because Congress did not specify one. See 2008 WL 4808823, at *22. This is not completely
accurate, as Oneida II recognized a federal common law right for unlawful dispossession,
not an implied cause of action under the Nonintercourse Act. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 233.
But it is certainly correct that the Court had the authority and responsibility to shape
remedies for that common law right.
250. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213.
251. See, e.g., id. at 216-17 (stating that the long delay in bringing suit and the changes to
the region “preclude[d] OIN from gaining the disruptive remedy it now seeks” (emphasis
added)); id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks . . . is unavailable . . . .” (emphasis added));
see also Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 288-89 (2d Cir. 2005) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (collecting quotations that demonstrate that “the clear language of City of Sherrill
confines its holding to the use of laches to bar certain relief, not to bar a claim or all
remedies”).
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The Court was simply evaluating a remedy for the OIN’s Oneida II right
that sought to revive tribal sovereignty. Justice Souter’s concurrence
bolsters this reading of Sherrill. If he had to write separately to explain that
inaction of the OIN was “central to the very claims of right,”252 the majority
opinion must have held that equitable considerations barred only the OIN’s
requested remedy.
Finally, the Court’s primary concern with the OIN’s request for tax
immunity was the risk of future disruption from granting a remedy that
permitted the Tribe to assert sovereignty. The Court worried that granting
this remedy would “project redress . . . into the present and future” and
“have disruptive practical consequences.”253 The Court seemingly treated
all exercises of tribal sovereignty identically,254 but it was plainly focused
on the forward-looking remedy that would have permitted the Tribe to
assert its sovereignty, not on the retrospective damages award the Court
authorized in Oneida II.
Putting these four core aspects of Sherrill together demonstrates the
narrow scope of the opinion. The Court was solely concerned about the
disruptive consequences of a remedy in land claim litigation that would
252. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 222 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 202, 219 (majority opinion); accord id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks . . .
is unavailable because of . . . the present-day and future disruption such relief would
engender.”); id. at 219 (rejecting the “unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian
sovereign control”).
254. Although the Second Circuit has taken its inherent disruption rule too far, see infra
Part IV.A, the Sherrill opinion could be read to support an all-or-nothing approach to
evaluating assertions of sovereignty. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202-03, 219-20 (stating that
the OIN could not “unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part,”
evaluating the disruption of the OIN’s requested tax immunity based on risks of exemptions
from other state and local regulations, and not providing factual support for its conclusory
belief that granting the OIN tax immunity would be disruptive). Some courts have adopted
this approach and thus failed to use factual evidence to support their conclusion that tribal
sovereignty would cause disruption, see supra text accompanying notes 158-62 (noting that
the courts in Union Springs and Aurelius simply assumed that building casinos in violation
of local zoning laws would be disruptive), or evaluated whether to permit a tribe to exercise
its sovereignty based on the most disruptive possible use of the land, see supra text
accompanying notes 163-72 (noting this approach in Shinnecock). Although the Sherrill
Court may have thought the OIN’s assertion of sovereignty in a heavily non-Indian area
following its removal from New York two centuries earlier was so disruptive that the
specific way in which the OIN sought to exercise its sovereignty was irrelevant (and thus
might have evaluated the disruptive effects of the specific exercise of sovereignty under
more tribe-friendly facts), this is only speculation. But see infra note 319 (arguing that
Sherrill’s all-or-nothing approach is misguided and that the Court should replace that
approach with a more fact-specific analysis of disruption).
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permit a tribe to revive its sovereignty over the land. These concerns
centered on this forward-looking remedy relating to exercises of tribal
sovereignty and did not affect the Oneida II cause of action for damages
stemming from unlawful dispossession. Although the decision sought to
protect non-Indian justifiable expectations in the context of remedies for
this particular cause of action, it did not elevate these expectations above
tribal rights completely, especially not outside of the land claim context.
IV. Evaluating Sherrill’s Applications in the Lower Courts
This understanding of Sherrill is key to evaluating how lower courts
have interpreted and applied the decision. As described in Part II, some
courts have adopted the focus in Sherrill on disruption to non-Indian
expectations in order to alter established doctrine in tribal land claim and
sovereignty litigation. These courts have not remained faithful to Sherrill’s
underlying principles and concerns. As a land claim case involving a unique
prospective remedy seeking to permit the exercise of tribal sovereignty,
Sherrill’s application beyond its facts should be limited. Section IV.A
explains how the Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule barring all tribal
land claims ignores the intact common law right from Oneida II and the
focus in Sherrill on prospective, disruptive remedies. Part IV.B then
demonstrates that courts are wrong to apply Sherrill to sovereignty disputes
because those disputes involve claims of sovereignty as the primary right,
not just the remedy, and raise less acute concerns about disruption to nonIndian justifiable expectations.
A. Tribal Land Claims
The Second Circuit has derived from Sherrill an inherent disruption rule
that bars all land claims regardless of the remedy sought by the tribe. 255
This approach is incompatible with Sherrill itself. Most fundamentally, the
inherent disruption rule ignores that the Supreme Court has decided that
tribes are entitled to damages for their land claims. The on-point precedent
is Oneida II, not Sherrill. The Court’s reaffirmance of Oneida II in Sherrill
means that tribes are still entitled to pursue at least claims for damages for
unlawful dispossession, and the Second Circuit cannot simply overrule
Oneida II through a convoluted interpretation of Sherrill. To the contrary,
the Court’s statement in Oneida II that, although “[o]ne would have thought
that claims dating back for more than a century and a half would have been
barred long ago . . . , neither petitioners nor we have found any applicable
255. See supra Section II.A.1.
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statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for holding that the
[Tribe’s] claims are barred” is still good law.256
The inherent disruption rule overlooks the fundamental distinction
between rights and remedies in Sherrill. The inherent disruption bar on all
tribal land claims regardless of remedy contradicts Sherrill’s explicit focus
on the specific remedy the OIN sought. The Second Circuit in Cayuga
declared that Sherrill primarily concerned “the disruptive nature of the
claim itself,” but it failed to justify this interpretation: The three quotations
it pulled from Sherrill all refer to disruption from the OIN’s desired
remedy, not its entire claim.257 The Second Circuit’s categorical ban on
tribal land claims is thus inconsistent with the pragmatic focus on remedies
in Sherrill.
This approach also renders meaningless Sherrill’s concern about present
and future consequences of recognizing tribal sovereignty. In barring
monetary damages, the court has ignored that “the essence of compensatory
damages” is “to restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the
position he would have been in but for the wrong.”258 Money damages are a
purely retrospective remedy that focus not on future consequences, but
instead on rectifying past wrongful conduct.259 Thus, damages for a land
claim redress the past harm the tribe has suffered while not altering the
present or future ownership and governance of the land, which were the
concern in Sherrill. If money damages trigger Sherrill’s concern about
present and future consequences, it is difficult to imagine a remedy that
does not.260 Again, the Second Circuit’s approach turns Sherrill into a

256. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (Gershon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing the majority for “foreclos[ing] the Oneidas from obtaining any remedy”
despite recognition of their common law right in Oneida II). Two cases the Sherrill Court
relied on for their equitable considerations also explicitly stated that tribes are entitled to
monetary damages in land claims. See Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 272
U.S. 351, 359 (1926); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 334 (1892).
257. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 2005).
258. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 14 (4th ed. 2010); accord 1-1
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01 (2017); 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64.1 (4th ed.
2017).
259. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (listing “money
damages” as the quintessential “retrospective relief”); Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21-22
(1999) (per curiam) (distinguishing the “retrospective” relief of damages with “forwardlooking . . . injunctive relief”).
260. See Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 290 n.13 (Hall, J., dissenting). Although all damages
remedies are retrospective, the Second Circuit’s holding in County of Oneida that even a fair
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doctrine about rights even though the Court explicitly stated it was
addressing remedies. The concern about present and future consequences in
Sherrill thus requires distinguishing between more disruptive, prospective,
equitable remedies, such as injunctions, and less disruptive, retrospective,
legal remedies, such as damages.261
Moreover, remedies like declaratory relief and damages do not trigger
Sherrill’s concerns about disruption in the same way as an assertion of
sovereignty. A declaratory judgment against the state for illegally
purchasing tribal land declares legal rights but does not require or prohibit
action262 and cannot lead to contempt;263 thus, although a declaratory
judgment may be prospective, it does not have practical consequences for
non-Indian landowners. Similarly, damages compensate the tribe for prior
injury and do not change governance in the area going forward.264 These
remedies may be “disruptive” in the literal sense that they alter the status
quo; this reasoning, however, would label as disruptive any litigation
remedy in any suit, which would conflict with Sherrill’s focus on the
specific remedy at issue. The Second Circuit has stated that these remedies
throw into doubt the validity of current land ownership,265 but the pragmatic
principles of Sherrill permit courts to fashion remedies to prevent
unjustified disruptions while also providing justice for tribes. If a court

compensation claim seeking adequate consideration for a two-centuries-old land sale is
forward-looking is especially nonsensical.
261. See id. at 289-90. Of course, not all equitable remedies are forward-looking. A
constructive trust, for example, is an equitable remedy that redresses past misconduct. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 (AM. LAW. INST.
2011). An explanation of Sherrill’s applicability to all types of remedies is beyond the scope
of this Article, but the prospective or retrospective nature of the remedy, not its status as
equitable or legal, appears dispositive.
262. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 1 (West 2017).
263. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (“[A declaratory judgment] is a
much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not
ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt.”
(quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))).
264. New York has repeatedly argued that large damage awards would be disruptive
because they would significantly impact state and local budgets. See, e.g., Brief for
Respondents in Opposition at 24, United States v. New York, 565 U.S. 970 (No. 10-1404),
2011 WL 3010263. The higher the damages, however, the more serious the injury the tribe
has suffered. It is perverse to permit the state to avoid any remedy for its unlawful actions
simply because the wrongdoing was so substantial.
265. See supra text accompanying note 106, 112.
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awarded damages and the tribe returned to court to eject landowners, for
example, the court could deny ejectment as too disruptive under Sherrill.266
The Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule goes beyond a faithful
reading of Sherrill by barring claims brought by the United States.267 The
Second Circuit has failed to justify why tribal land claims are not subject to
the rule that delay-based equitable defenses cannot bar the United States’
claims.268 Most confusing is the court’s position that the United States acts
on behalf of a private party when it intervenes in tribal land claims. As
other courts have recognized, the United States has a sovereign interest both
as trustee for tribes269 and in enforcing treaties and federal statutes, like the

266. Relativity of title would prevent anyone else from seeking to eject landowners on
the basis of their faulty title. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 160 (6th ed. 2014) (“[O]ne who does not have legal title to the
land may still protect her rights against a later intruder.”); 90 N.Y. JUR. 2D Real PropertyPossessory Actions § 346 (West 2017) (“The plaintiff in an action to recover real property
must recover, if at all, upon the strength of his or her own title, and not upon the weakness of
the title of his or her adversary . . . .”). The argument that granting tribes certain
nondisruptive remedies would throw modern land ownership into chaos also incorrectly
assumes that property rights are an all-or-nothing proposition. As aboriginal title makes
clear, American real property law often divides property rights among multiple parties. See
Singer, supra note 98, at 45 (rejecting Cayuga’s reasoning because aboriginal title
demonstrates that it is “nonsense” to argue that only one person can have title to land at once
and noting that “[r]ecognizing Indian title within the state of New York would not
necessarily mean that longstanding non-Indian possessors would not own their homes or not
be able to get mortgages” because courts “could define the relative rights of Indian nations
and non-Indian possessors in a way that protected the reliance interests of the non-Indian
possessors while vindicating tribal title”).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
268. See Fort, supra note 113, at 388-99.
269. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist.,
No. EDCV 13-883 JGB (SPx), 2016 WL 2621301, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016); Saginaw
Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 4808823, at *23 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 22, 2008); Fort, supra note 113, at 397; see also United States v. Minnesota, 270
U.S. 181, 194 (1926) (noting the United States’ interest “as a sovereign” in a suit to recover
land wrongly issued to Minnesota instead of a tribe because of “its guardianship over the
Indians” and “its right to . . . remov[e] unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its
obligations”); Ute Indian Tribe v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 2016) (doubting
that Sherrill could justify stripping Indian Country status from trust land because “laches is a
line of defense that usually may not be asserted against the United States”), cert. dismissed,
137 S. Ct. 2328 (2017); cf. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 174
(2011) (“The difference between a private common-law trust and the statutory Indian trust
follows from the unique position of the Government as sovereign.”).
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Nonintercourse Act.270 In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that
the United States has a sovereign interest in securing redress for a transfer
of Indian land in violation of federal law.271 Sherrill did not alter this
doctrine whatsoever. The United States was not a party, and the case did
not involve trust land or even turn on the treaties between the OIN and the
federal government.272
Finally, Sherrill did not change the favorable federal policy toward tribal
land claims, which the inherent disruption rule ignores. This policy began
with the Nonintercourse Act, in which Congress promised to protect Indian
land holdings. Although the United States has not always lived up to its
promise,273 the intervention of the federal government in a number of
Second Circuit land claims shows that it believes tribes are entitled to a
remedy. In enacting the Indian Claims Limitation Act (ICLA) to govern
tribal land claims, Congress exhibited a desire to permit tribes to pursue
these claims, subject to certain restrictions, because it thought the United
States had not adequately protected tribal interests.274 Though it expressed
270. See Saginaw Chippewa, 2008 WL 4808823, at *23. In County of Oneida, the
Second Circuit seemed to acknowledge the United States’ “own interest in the vindication of
a federal statute,” but said the same was true in Cayuga. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 129 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010).
271. See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 438 (1912) (noting that an unlawful
allotment transfer was not “simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the Indian” but
also a violation of “the governmental rights of the United States”).
272. See Agua Caliente, 2016 WL 2621301, at *4. Nor does the allegedly egregious
delay in bringing suit or the fact that Congress only enacted a statute of limitations for land
claim actions by the United States in 1966 make laches applicable in this context. See supra
text accompanying note 131. When Congress provided a statute of limitations for the claims
of the United States, it restarted the clock for any already accrued actions, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2415(g) (2012), demonstrating an intent to permit the United States to pursue “ancient”
land claims.
273. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 205-06 (2005)
(recognizing that the federal government played an important role in facilitating the removal
of the Oneidas from New York in the early 1800s).
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415; Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985) (noting that the
statute demonstrates congressional “concern that the United States had failed to live up to its
responsibilities as trustee for the Indians”). The Second Circuit litigation has produced
significant debate over whether ICLA set a statute of limitations for tribal land claims.
Compare Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21-22, United States v. New York, 565 U.S. 970
(2011) (No. 10-1404), 2011 WL 1881816 (arguing that, because 28 U.S.C. § 2415 set a
statute of limitations for the OIN land claim that had not run, the Second Circuit’s
application of laches to bar the claim was inappropriate), with Brief for Respondents in
Opposition, supra note 264, at 27-28 (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2415 did not set a statute of
limitations for the OIN land claim). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article, but at the
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concern about one specific remedy, Sherrill did not undermine the
favorable policy toward tribal land claims generally.275
Properly understood, Sherrill’s application to tribal land claims should
be limited to barring courts from issuing equitable relief that permits tribes
to exercise sovereignty after many years of delay in heavily non-Indian
communities. Courts should still award monetary damages and declaratory
relief to tribes for the unlawful dispossession of their land.
How should courts evaluate arguments based on Sherrill in tribal land
claims cases? Courts should not rule on the pleadings, as they do under
Second Circuit precedent, because Sherrill only applies to certain
remedies.276 Instead, courts should rely on evidence submitted by the
parties to determine whether the length of delay, size of the non-Indian
population, and level of non-Indian development trigger the same concerns
of disruption to non-Indian expectations that animated Sherrill.277 The
Second Circuit has not directly addressed whether these factors make a
difference because every case it has adjudicated concerned similar facts to

very least ICLA demonstrated congressional intent that time-based defenses should not bar
all such claims. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244 (“[W]e think the statutory framework
adopted in 1982 presumes the existence of an Indian right of action not otherwise subject to
any statute of limitations.”). The Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule, which effectively
bars all tribal land claims, contradicts this congressional intent.
275. The Second Circuit justified its inherent disruption rule in Cayuga in part by saying
that doctrines applicable in other areas of law do not always apply to tribal land claims. See
supra text accompanying note 107. As Judge Hall noted forcefully in dissent, courts treat
tribal claims differently to provide tribes with “more protection, rather than less, as a result
of strong federal policy protecting tribal title from application of state law.” See Cayuga
Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 283 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (Hall, J., dissenting); cf.
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982) (“We have
consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to tribes and tribal
activities must be ‘construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of
[Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144
(1980))).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15. The standards for both motions to
dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings permit courts to throw out a case only
when the plaintiff’s factual allegations do not plausibly support a claim that the defendant
acted unlawfully. See, e.g., Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Entm’t Props. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 52 (2d
Cir. 2016) (motion to dismiss); Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2012) (motion
for judgment on the pleadings).
277. On summary judgment, courts can evaluate submitted evidence for this information,
instead of relying on judicial notice like the Second Circuit currently does. See supra text
accompanying notes 116-18.
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Sherrill.278 Given its emphasis on the inherent disruption of tribal land
claims,279 the Second Circuit may disagree with Canadian St. Regis that
these factors are relevant in determining whether Sherrill applies.280
However, the reason the Sherrill Court thought the assertion of tribal
sovereignty would be a disruptive remedy was the lengthy period after
dispossession before the OIN brought suit and the mostly non-Indian
modern population.281 An exercise of tribal sovereignty in a predominantly
Indian area or after a shorter period of time does not risk disruption to nonIndian expectations in the same way.
B. Sovereignty
As discussed above, lower courts have considered Sherrill’s application
to a broad range of sovereignty disputes. What is clear is that the courts in
Union Springs and Aurelius correctly deemed Sherrill relevant to tribal
attempts to build casinos in violation of local zoning laws. Centuries after
dispossession, the tribes in both cases were attempting to reassert
sovereignty over land purchased within a historic reservation, just like in
Sherrill. The Sherrill Court explicitly mentioned these cases as examples of
its concern about disruption to non-Indian justifiable expectations.282 Yet
most sovereignty disputes do not fit this unusual paradigm. Courts can
easily distinguish these disputes from Sherrill on the ground that Sherrill
was the Court’s response to an unusual remedy for a tribal land claim. 283
But beyond this distinction (and largely because of it), Sherrill’s concerns
about disruption to justifiable expectations simply do not fit within the
contexts of reservation diminishment, hunting and fishing treaty rights, or
278. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44.
279. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2014).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 151-57 (describing how the Northern District of
New York in Canadian St. Regis determined that Sherrill should not apply to tribal land
claims involving a delay of only forty years or an area with a majority modern Indian
population).
281. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202-03, 214-15, 216-17,
221 (2005).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62. Although these cases seem to interpret
Sherrill correctly, this result conflicts squarely with federal policy. Under IGRA, tribes may
pursue class II gaming on their reservations without interference from states. See 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2703(4), 2710(b) (2012). As long as the reservations were not diminished, this clear
federal policy to permit tribes to pursue self-determination and economic development in the
context of gaming leaves no place for Sherrill’s equitable concerns. See id. § 2702(1) (noting
that one purpose of IGRA was to “promot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments”).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 237-47.
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tribal sovereign immunity. The Court has clear doctrine in all of these areas
that do not mention Sherrill. These doctrines either already incorporate
concerns about justifiable non-Indian expectations or do not account for
those concerns for logical reasons. There is thus no reason to deem Sherrill
an independent way to extinguish tribal sovereign rights.
1. Sovereign Treaty Disputes: Reservation Diminishment and Hunting
and Fishing Rights
Current analyses of Sherrill’s application to sovereign treaty disputes do
not sufficiently distinguish between two related but distinct issues that arise
in these cases. These two issues involve the questions of right and remedy
that were central in Sherrill. The first issue is whether the tribe still
possesses a sovereign treaty right or whether Congress has diminished the
reservation or abrogated other treaty rights. Assuming the sovereign treaty
right still exists, the second issue involves fashioning a remedy that permits
or prohibits the tribe from exercising sovereignty in a certain way.
Although courts often merge these two issues, they are conceptually
distinct.284 Only the Western District of Michigan in Little Traverse has
explicitly recognized this distinction.285 Ultimately, Sherrill may not apply
to either question, but because the relevant considerations for each issue are
different, it is important to recognize the conceptual distinction.286
Within this framework, Sherrill plainly does not apply to the first
question of whether the tribe has a sovereign treaty right. The Court has
made clear that the power to abrogate Indian treaty rights rests only with

284. See Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016) (“Because petitioners have
raised only the single question of [reservation] diminishment, we express no view about
whether equitable considerations of laches and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe’s power
to tax the retailers of Pender . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Brief for the United States at 53-54,
Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (No. 14-1406), 2015 WL 9181061 (stating that the reservation
diminishment issue is “both analytically distinct from and logically prior to the question
whether the Tribe may exercise jurisdiction over non-members within the Reservation’s
borders once those borders are properly understood”); cf. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca
County, 260 F. Supp. 3d 290, 314-15 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (refusing to consider a Sherrill
argument for a reservation diminishment counterclaim against the tribe because “[t]he
existence of a reservation, sovereign authority over land, and laches are three distinct issues,
of which the counterclaim mentions only the first”).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
286. Among other errors, merging these issues leads to the faulty argument that Sherrill,
by barring the OIN from exercising tax immunity over its lands, must have found its
reservation disestablished. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18-19, Upstate
Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States, No. 16-1320 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017).
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Congress.287 Congress must use “clear and plain” language to abrogate
Indian treaty rights, which “are too fundamental to be easily cast aside.” 288
And, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in United States v. Washington, laches
and other equitable defenses cannot defeat Indian treaty rights.289 Applying
Sherrill’s equitable consideration to abolish tribal hunting and fishing rights
would contravene these established principles and intrude on congressional
plenary power over tribes.
Since the right to exercise sovereignty over a reservation is one type of
treaty right,290 this same logic applies to reservation diminishment cases.
The “well settled” Solem test focuses solely on whether Congress has
clearly manifested an intent to diminish reservation boundaries.291 Leaving
no room for doubt, the Court has reiterated that “only Congress can divest a
reservation of its land and diminish its boundaries.”292 Although the Court
has sometimes used imprecise language suggesting that reservation

287. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993); United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); see also Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians v.
United States, 277 U.S. 424, 436 (1928) (stating that abrogating treaties and statutes are
“political, not judicial, powers”); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903)
(“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress
from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government.”).
288. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738-39; accord Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).
289. 157 F.3d 630, 649 (9th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179
U.S. 494, 533 (1900) (“We are not at liberty to dispense with any of the conditions or
requirements of the treaty, or to take away any qualification or integral part of any
stipulation, upon any notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial justice.”).
290. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (stating
the question at issue as “whether Congress intended by the 1894 Act to modify the
reservation set aside for the Yankton Tribe in the 1858 Treaty”). The subsequent discussion
applies to the typical diminishment claim concerning a reservation secured by treaty. But
similar principles would apply to a diminishment claim about a reservation set aside via
executive order. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 185,
§ 15.04(4), at 1012-13 (explaining the legal status of executive order reservations). Only
Congress has the power to alter the boundaries of executive order reservations, 25 U.S.C.
§ 398d (2012) (“Changes in the boundaries of reservations created by Executive order . . .
for the use and occupation of Indians shall not be made except by Act of Congress.”), so
courts cannot base diminishment decisions on fear of disruption to non-Indian expectations.
291. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078-79 (2016).
292. Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)); accord Yankton Sioux,
522 U.S. at 343.
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diminishment can occur through demographic change,293 the Court has
never adopted this approach. Since only Congress can diminish a
reservation, Sherrill’s judicially-created equitable doctrine has no place in
the inquiry.294
The Court confirmed this analysis in 2016 in its Nebraska v. Parker
decision by reaffirming, with no mention of Sherrill, that reservation
diminishment is solely a question of congressional intent.295 This
reaffirmation of the Solem test is significant in light of two arguments made
in the case: 1) Nebraska’s argument that the Court should alter the test to
emphasize modern demographics and jurisdictional history296 and 2) an
argument from amici that under Sherrill “a tribe may lose sovereign control
over ancient reservation land, regardless of congressional intent, when that
area has long been regulated, governed, and populated by non-Indian
inhabitants.”297 Although the Court ended the Parker opinion by leaving
open the question of whether Sherrill could bar the tribe from taxing nonIndian businesses on the reservation,298 this statement concerned not the

293. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 356 (“Where non-Indian settlers flooded into
the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we
have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred.” (quoting
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471)).
294. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL
4808823, at *23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008); cf. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544
U.S. 197, 224-25 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “do[ing] what
only Congress may do” by “effectively proclaim[ing] a diminishment of the Tribe’s
reservation”).
295. See Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1078-79.
296. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 23-24, Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (No. 14-1406), 2015
WL 7294863 (arguing that the area’s “demographic and jurisdictional history . . .
necessitates a finding of de facto diminishment” to avoid “seriously disrupt[ing] the
justifiable expectations of the people living in the area” (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S.
339, 421 (1994))).
297. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Village of Hobart and Pender Public Schools in
Support of Petitioners at 7, Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (No. 14-1406), 2015 WL 7450416. In
addition to the local school district, the brief was filed by the Village of Hobart in
Wisconsin, which has fought with the Oneidas over its attempts to regulate activity on their
land. See, e.g., Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Village of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837, 838, 842 (7th
Cir. 2013) (affirming a grant of summary judgment to the Oneidas on their claim that the
Village could not assess storm water management fees on tribal land); Oneida Nation v.
Village of Hobart, No. 16-C-1217, 2017 WL 4773299, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 2017)
(resolving burden of proof issues in the Oneidas’ suit to prevent the Village from enforcing a
special events ordinance on tribal land).
298. See Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1082.
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initial question of diminishment but the second issue of what sovereignty
the tribe could exercise on its undiminished reservation.
Nothing in Sherrill altered the established principle that only Congress
can abrogate treaty rights or diminish a reservation. As a land claim
decision, Sherrill said nothing about sovereign treaty rights whatsoever.
The Court stated that its decision did not address the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the Treaty of Buffalo Creek or the question of reservation
diminishment. In doing so, the Court explicitly recognized that only
Congress can diminish a reservation.299 Sherrill’s focus on remedies also
makes it inapplicable to questions about treaty rights: While Sherrill
evaluated an assertion of tribal sovereignty as a remedy in a land claim,
treaty cases involve assertions of tribal sovereignty as the primary right. As
such, district courts have consistently held that Sherrill did not alter the
Second Circuit’s holding that Congress has not disestablished the Oneida
Reservation.300 The interpretive gymnastics required to read Sherrill to
permit courts to alter treaty rights are especially inappropriate given that
“treaties enjoy a unique position in our law.”301
The second issue left open in Parker is more difficult than the initial
question of whether Sherrill altered tribal sovereign rights. As the Western
District of Michigan suggested in Little Traverse, it would be theoretically
sound for a court to find that Congress has not abrogated a treaty right but
then fashion a remedy that limits how the tribe can exercise that right.
Because of Sherrill’s emphasis on prospective remedies and judicial
discretion in fashioning equitable relief, concerns about future disruption fit
better at the remedial stage, even in the context of tribal treaty rights. 302
Accordingly, litigants have argued that the exercise of certain tribal treaty
rights is as, if not more, disruptive of non-Indian justifiable expectations
than the tax immunity at issue in Sherrill. Tribal reassertions of sovereignty
over reservations may disrupt settled expectations by creating a
299. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215 n.9; see also id. at 215 (referring to the “context of the
diminishment of an Indian reservation” as “different” from the situation at issue).
300. See cases cited supra notes 174-77.
301. United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 649 (9th Cir. 1998). A similar analysis
shows that Sherrill does not permit courts to extinguish aboriginal title even where that title
is not secured by treaty, such as in the Shinnecock casino litigation. Just like with treaties,
extinguishment of aboriginal title is within the “supreme” power of Congress, United
States v. Santa Fe. Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941), and thus not within the purview
of the courts.
302. See Washington, 157 F.3d at 650-51 (finding that, although the court could not use
equitable considerations to interpret Indian treaties, it could do so to craft remedies based on
those treaties).
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checkerboard of jurisdiction and complicated governance issues.303 For
example, the inability of state and local governments to enforce public
safety regulations, such as fire codes and environmental laws, on tribal
lands within reservations could jeopardize the safety of non-Indian
communities and their ability to govern themselves.304 Recognizing tribal
sovereignty could cause substantial litigation because non-Indians have no
other method of influencing tribal governments.305 From this perspective,
these concerns are most acute when the population is heavily non-Indian
and state and local governments have exercised jurisdiction over tribal
lands for decades.306
Despite its superficial logic, this argument fails to acknowledge that
Sherrill’s concerns about disruption were intimately tied to the land claim
context in which the dispute arose. A broad application of Sherrill to
sovereignty disputes would require interpreting the decision not just as
crafting a remedy for a land claim, but instead expressing general concern
about disruptive tribal activity.307 Sherrill, however, expressly emphasized
that the assertion of tribal sovereignty arose in the context of a land
claim.308
The same concerns about disruption that animated Sherrill do not apply
to litigation over treaty rights. In the reservation diminishment context, the
Court has already incorporated these concerns into the third factor of the
303. See Osage Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250,
1265-66 (N.D. Okla. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir.
2010).
304. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Village of Hobart and Pender Public Schools in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 297, at 21-24.
305. See Brief of Oklahoma Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance, supra note 239, at 23.
306. See Brief of the Appellees at 55-56, Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (No. 09-5050) (arguing that
the assertion of tribal sovereignty at issue was more disruptive than in Sherrill because the
reservation covered 1.5 million acres; only 3.5% of the population were tribal members;
85% of the land was unrestricted; the state and county had long exercised criminal
jurisdiction, including over crimes involving tribal members, and had provided social
services to the entire population; and the Tribe did not seek to exercise jurisdiction over fee
land and nonmembers until 2004).
307. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee Director of Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, supra note 239, at 30 (“[B]ecause [Sherrill] turned on the nature of the relief
sought (equitable) and the fact that the relief sought would disrupt the sovereignty of the
State, her counties, and subdivisions, the applicability of these defenses is not limited solely
to land claims. Instead, the Court’s reasoning in Sherrill applies to any attempt . . . to seek
equitable relief that disrupts settled expectations and the sovereignty of the State . . . .”).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 242-49.
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Solem test, which requires consideration of “the subsequent demographic
history of opened lands.”309 Under this factor, courts analyze the Indian
population and history of state and tribal jurisdiction.310 Further, courts
consider non-Indian justifiable expectations and the burdens that
recognizing tribal sovereignty would have on state and local
governments.311 Allowing litigants to rely on the third Solem factor to argue
for reservation diminishment and then raise Sherrill at the remedial stage
would permit two bites at the same apple.
True, a finding of diminishment cannot rest on the third Solem factor
alone.312 However, this reflects the fact that non-Indian expectations are
often not justified in the reservation diminishment context. Non-Indian
settlers knew they were moving into areas with checkerboard jurisdiction
caused by congressional opening of the reservation; in Sherrill, only the
OIN lawsuit threatened to create a checkerboard of tribal and state
sovereignty.313 Relatedly, although the land transfers underlying Sherrill
were unlawful, New York, its municipalities, and its population reasonably
309. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1081 (2016).
310. Compare South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356-57 (1998)
(recognizing as factors supporting diminishment that Indians owned less than 10% of the
land at issue, over two-thirds of the population was non-Indian, the land included several
municipalities incorporated under state law, the State had exercised jurisdiction over the land
since 1894, and the Tribe only recently attempted to assert jurisdiction over nontrust land),
with Solem, 465 U.S. at 479-80 (supporting its finding that the reservation was not
diminished with evidence that tribal authorities and the federal government exercised
jurisdiction in the area, the population was half Indian, and the seat of the tribal government
was on the land at issue).
311. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420-21 (1994) (finding the reservation diminished
in part because reaffirming that predominately non-Indian land was part of a reservation
would “seriously burden[] the administration of state and local governments” and would
“seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area” (quoting
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471)); cf. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism:
The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 2021, 25-26 (1999) (arguing that a desire to protect non-Indian justifiable expectations
animates the Court’s reservation diminishment doctrine and that the doctrine only makes
sense as a way to determine when a reservation has lost its Indian character).
312. See Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1081-82 (acknowledging that “th[e] Court has never relied
solely on this third consideration to find diminishment” and that justifiable “expectations
alone, resulting from the Tribe’s failure to assert jurisdiction, cannot diminish reservation
boundaries”); Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 356 (referring to the third factor as “the least
compelling”).
313. For this reason, the Sherrill Court repeatedly referred to the OIN’s assertion of
sovereignty as “unilateral.” City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203, 21921 (2005).
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believed that these transfers and the removal of the Oneidas had substituted
the state sovereign for the tribal sovereign.314 This was especially true given
the federal government’s acquiescence to and assistance in the Oneidas’
removal.315 In stark contrast, where Congress opened a reservation to nonIndian settlement without diminishing it, the settlers and their successors
never had justifiable expectations that there was no tribal sovereign because
tribal members always remained in the area.316 The non-Indian population
cannot develop these justifiable expectations that support restricting tribal
sovereignty simply by choosing to ignore the presence of the tribal
sovereign.317
Applying Sherrill in this context would also contradict Congress’s view
that tribal sovereignty in Indian Country is not overly disruptive. The Indian
Country statute delineates land over which tribes and the federal
government have primary civil and criminal jurisdiction.318 As noted above,
Sherrill seems to require an all-or-nothing analysis that assumes tribes
would exercise sovereignty in a disruptive manner and then bars tribes from
exercising that sovereignty in any capacity.319 Utilizing such an approach in
reservation diminishment cases would deny tribes the ability to govern
much of Indian Country, which would contravene congressional intent in

314. See id. at 216.
315. See id. at 214.
316. Where Congress did intend to diminish a reservation, expectations about the
absence of the tribal sovereign are more justified, which is why the third Solem factor can
only augment more direct evidence of congressional intent. Furthermore, the fact that tribes
generally have been consistently present on the reservation in diminishment cases
demonstrates another fundamental difference with Sherrill. In Sherrill, the underlying claim
undeniably accrued at the time of the unlawful land transfers. But it is difficult to say when
reservation diminishment claims accrue: Does the tribe have one claim that arose when the
state or local government first exercised on-reservation jurisdiction? Or does the tribal claim
reaccrue each time the state or local government exercises jurisdiction on the reservation?
317. A similar analysis demonstrates that concerns about non-Indian settled expectations
are also irrelevant in cases like Shinnecock, where the Tribe sought to build a casino on
lands to which it alleged it retained aboriginal title outside of any treaty. See supra text
accompanying notes 163-67. The tribal sovereign and checkerboarding jurisdiction were
always present, and the state cannot develop justifiable expectations by selectively ignoring
the presence of the tribal sovereign.
318. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522
U.S. 520, 527 & n.1 (1998).
319. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/8

No. 1]

SPECIAL FEATURE

297

the Indian Country statute to permit tribes to exercise sovereignty on their
reservations.320
Moreover, the argument for applying Sherrill to reservation
diminishment cases overstates the negative consequences of reaffirming
reservations. Tribal governments have no criminal jurisdiction and only
limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians;321 as Justice Sotomayor
acknowledged at the Parker oral argument, these limits protect non-Indians
on reservations from significant disruption at the hands of tribal
governments.322 State and local governments are not powerless to regulate

320. Of course, this argument applies to the dispute in Sherrill as well: The Court
interfered with congressional intent by extinguishing the OIN’s sovereignty on land it
acknowledged was Indian Country. See Jennifer R. Sunderlin, Note, One Nation, Indivisible:
American “Indian Country” in the Wake of City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 70
ALB. L. REV. 1563, 1566 (2007). This is one of many reasons that Sherrill’s all-or-nothing
approach does not withstand scrutiny. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 86, at 550 (criticizing the
Court for this aspect of its opinion). This mode of analysis is also incompatible with the
case-specific approach courts use to evaluate tribal sovereignty disputes, see, e.g., Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997), and unnecessary because the Court has so
restricted tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers that protecting non-Indian expectations only
requires courts to step in under specific circumstances that threaten severe disruption, cf.
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 226 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for its “greatly
exaggerated” fear of “opening a Pandora’s box of tribal powers” that ignored state authority
on tribal lands and the limited power of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers). In
addition, this approach incorrectly assumes that all exercises of tribal sovereignty are equally
disruptive to non-Indian expectations and state and local governments. For example, tax
immunity is fundamentally the same as a damages award in that it simply denies the
government revenue; unless the land at issue covers a significant portion of the municipality,
the disruption would be minimal. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at
16. Exemptions from local zoning laws may be quite disruptive, but their effects depend on
the area’s population density and traffic patterns. Disruption to “innocent” landowners seems
more troubling than disruption to the state government, especially when that government
committed an unlawful act by dispossessing tribes of their land. A full analysis of how the
Court should reframe its disruption analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but it should
consider a sliding-scale approach that asks, based on evidence from the parties like those in
Shinnecock, see supra text accompanying note 163, how disruptive the assertion of
sovereignty would be and whom it primarily would affect.
321. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 32930, 341 (2008) (delineating limited circumstances under which tribes can exercise civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195
(1978) (holding that tribes cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
322. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 9 (questioning Nebraska on the
effects of finding the reservation undiminished given the Tribe’s limited powers on its
reservation).
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conduct on reservations.323 Outside of the Indian context, some federal
facilities create checkerboards of jurisdiction with state authority, but post
offices, for example, do not create lawless areas that prevent state and local
governments from regulating their residents effectively.324 Adding a third
sovereign on reservations does not make the situation any more
problematic.325 Additionally, the risk that reservations would become
lawless regions threatening the welfare of non-Indians is overblown. Tribal
members, no less than non-Indians, want emergency services, good schools,
environmental protections, and more from their governments. Tribal
members are just as unlikely to accept the widespread lawlessness and
excessive development that concern non-Indian litigants in these cases.
Tribes have incentives to protect non-Indians on their reservations and
cooperate with state and local governments: If they do not, displeased nonIndians can petition Congress to eliminate their sovereignty completely.
By contrast, allowing Sherrill to bar tribes from exercising sovereignty
over their reservations would harm Indians and non-Indians alike. Indian
and non-Indian defendants would challenge tribal and federal criminal
jurisdiction, respectively, by arguing that demographic shifts created
“justifiable” expectations that the land where their crimes took place was no
longer Indian Country.326 Throwing the already complicated division of
criminal jurisdiction on reservations into more chaos would be dangerous.
Applying Sherrill in this context would encourage conflict between tribes
and non-Indian populations. So as not to appear to relinquish sovereignty,
tribes would have a strong incentive to avoid cooperative services
agreements with state and local governments and keep non-Indians off their
323. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989)
(permitting state taxation of reservation activity when the tribal, state, and federal interests
suggest that federal law does not preempt the tax). Given the Tribe’s limited powers over
nonmembers and the ability of the state to regulate some behavior on the reservation,
applying Sherrill in this context would actually give states three bites at the apple: the
Montana or preemption analysis; the Solem test; and the Sherrill analysis.
324. Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Village of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2013)
(noting that checkerboarding jurisdiction is “a familiar feature of American government,”
including with post offices and military bases).
325. It is also rather unfair to justify restricting tribal sovereignty by citing the harms of
alternating state and tribal jurisdiction when that checkerboarding is not inherent to a
reservation but is instead the result of the Court’s restrictions on tribal power in Indian
Country. See Singer, supra note 23, at 609.
326. See Brief for Historical and Legal Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 33, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406), 2015 WL
9412675.
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reservations.327 Likewise, state and local governments would try to exercise
more jurisdiction in Indian Country to create justifiable expectations against
tribal sovereignty.328 Litigation over jurisdiction would soar, as many state
and local governments would immediately initiate new reservation
diminishment claims.
For similar reasons, Sherrill’s concerns about non-Indian justifiable
expectations should not apply to the remedial phase in the context of tribal
hunting and fishing rights. The notion that non-Indians can develop
justifiable expectations in the denial of tribal treaty rights that require courts
to continue to deny those rights is strange in light of the status of Indian
treaties as federal law.329 Sherrill held that a particular remedy in a specific
lawsuit would be disruptive; extrapolating from that reasoning to argue that
enforcing federal law, in the form of Indian treaty rights, would be
disruptive is radical. Yet that is precisely what non-Indians seeking to rely
on their expectations to deny tribal treaty rights must argue. Permitting this
sort of reasoning would permit back-door judicial abrogation of treaty
rights, which the Court has repeatedly foreclosed.330
Courts can also distinguish hunting and fishing treaty rights disputes
from Sherrill on a more practical level. In many treaty rights cases, tribes
did not fail to assert their treaty rights to the same extent that the OIN
delayed bringing suit in Sherrill.331 More significantly, the risk of
disruption in this context is not substantial. In finding that laches barred a
tribe from exercising hunting rights, for example, the district court in
Ottawa Tribe had three primary concerns: safety risks to recreational land
users, lower state revenue from fewer visitors to public lands, and harm to
327. Courts should also consider cooperative agreements when analyzing disruption
under Sherrill. The court in Shinnecock thought the agreement of the Tribe to follow state
environmental laws in building its casino irrelevant because it could choose to violate those
laws if the court affirmed its sovereignty. See supra text accompanying note 167. By
ignoring tribal attempts to lessen the impact of their activities on the surrounding area, this
approach disincentivizes tribes from entering into cooperative agreements, which would
only cause more disruption to non-Indians.
328. Cf. Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 6.
329. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 204 (1975) (noting that Indian treaties and congressionally
ratified agreements are “the supreme law of the land”).
330. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
331. See United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing
a fishing rights dispute from Sherrill by noting that, unlike in Sherrill, the Tribe did not
relinquish its treaty rights), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).
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conservation efforts.332 None of these concerns merits barring tribes from
exercising their treaty rights. Tribes have incentives to stop unsafe hunting
or fishing practices to avoid criminal prosecution and maintain good
relations with neighbors. Given the tribes’ use of these safe practices,
visitors would continue to utilize the lands. Tribes and states would likely
enter into compacts to restrict where tribes could exercise their treaty rights,
further protecting states’ interests. States have significant power to regulate
the exercise of tribal hunting and fishing treaty rights to protect
conservation efforts.333 Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “an
Indian tribe’s treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state land are not
irreconcilable with a State’s sovereignty over [its] natural resources.”334
2. Sovereign Immunity
Unlike the confusion over sovereign treaty rights, the developing
consensus on tribal sovereign immunity is correct: Sherrill had no effect on
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.335 Focused on the availability of a
specific remedy in the OIN land claim, Sherrill said nothing about
sovereign immunity at all. The Court made the OIN’s land taxable, but it
did not discuss how state and local governments could enforce their taxes.
Rather than referring to sovereign immunity, the Court’s ambiguous
statement that the “equitable cast of the relief sought remains the same
whether asserted affirmatively or defensively” more plausibly prohibits the
tribe from asserting its sovereign authority and associated tax immunity in
foreclosure proceedings.336 Sherrill did not address other defenses, such as
sovereign immunity, that could bar methods of tax collection.337 Similarly,
332. See Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 541 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (N.D. Ohio
2008), aff’d on other grounds, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009). The court in this section of its
opinion was discussing tribal hunting rights, but similar arguments would apply to fishing
rights.
333. See Antoine, 420 U.S. at 207 (noting that states can regulate tribal hunting and
fishing as long as the regulation does not discriminate against Indians and is “a reasonable
and necessary conservation measure” and “its application to the Indians is necessary in the
interest of conservation”). Although this standard arose in the context of a particular treaty
with a Washington tribe, see Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968),
the Supreme Court and others have applied it more generally, see, e.g., Antoine, 420 U.S. at
207; United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981).
334. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999).
335. See supra Section II.B.4.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
337. Cf. Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 228-30, 232
(N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated as moot and remanded, 562
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the Court’s statement that “the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient
sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue” concerned
sovereign authority, not sovereign immunity.338 Finally, the concern in
Sherrill about potential disruption from certain remedies does not fit in
analyses of sovereign immunity, which serves to bar, rather than grant,
remedies.
Courts finding that Sherrill can abrogate tribal sovereign immunity have
argued that a contrary result would undermine the decision by leaving state
and local governments no way to enforce their laws.339 At its core, this
argument supports jettisoning sovereign immunity altogether, whether for
tribes or other sovereigns.340 Any assertion of sovereign immunity bars a
remedy despite the existence of a right.341 It is also something our laws
regularly allow: When a court grants a government official qualified
immunity in a constitutional tort suit, for example, the plaintiff cannot
recover a remedy despite a constitutional violation.342 Sherrill itself makes
clear that rights and remedies do not always go together by recognizing the
distinction between the two. The decision provides no reason to question
the Court’s general sovereign immunity doctrine.
In fact, the Court has only broadened sovereign immunity law in the past
two decades.343 Under current doctrine, tribes as sovereigns are entitled to

U.S. 42 (2011) (per curiam) (finding that Sherrill did not permit foreclosure of the OIN land
because the Nonintercourse Act forbids alienation of Indian land without congressional
approval and that the footnote in Sherrill “does not address the issue of alienability” but
“merely suggests that the [OIN] is foreclosed from asserting immunity from taxes as a
defense”).
338. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
340. Cf. Brief for the Petitioners at 27-30, Madison County, 562 U.S. 42 (2005) (No. 1072) (expressing skepticism of the doctrine’s origins and viability in support of the argument
that Sherrill bars tribes from asserting sovereign immunity in foreclosure proceedings).
341. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998) (“There is a
difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available
to enforce them.”).
342. See Madison County, 605 F.3d at 159 n.8 (giving qualified immunity as an example
of how our legal system denies remedies in certain instances where the defendant has
committed a wrong).
343. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 831-32 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s expansive view of both tribal and state sovereign
immunity).
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sovereign immunity344 that, like state and foreign sovereign immunity, does
not depend on geography.345 Due to the complex policy considerations at
issue, only Congress, not the courts, has authority to create exceptions to
tribal sovereign immunity.346 Even when the tribe is subject to state law, the
state cannot force compliance via direct suit.347 Significantly, although
tribal sovereign immunity has generated controversy among the justices, 348
the Court reaffirmed these core tenets in 2014, nine years after Sherrill.349
These tenets demonstrate why courts should not read Sherrill to alter
tribal sovereign immunity. Surely the Court, after repeatedly reaffirming a
broad understanding of sovereign immunity, did not revoke it without any
mention it was doing so, especially in a case like Sherrill that rested on
precisely the type of policy balancing the Court has left to Congress.
Furthermore, reading Sherrill to say that tribes do not have sovereign
immunity for disputes concerning land on which they cannot exercise
sovereign authority would be tantamount to finding that the Court impliedly
overruled the principle that tribal sovereign immunity applies to off344. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g,
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is
a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”).
345. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 790 (stating that tribal sovereign immunity applies
to “suits arising from a tribe’s commercial activities, even when they take place off Indian
lands”). The Court has discussed sovereign immunity as emerging from tribal sovereign
authority over territory, but only to explain why tribes, and not private landowners, enjoy
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). If this was not completely clear in Potawatomi, the Court’s
holdings in Kiowa and Bay Mills that tribes are entitled to sovereign immunity even for offreservation activities make it unarguable.
346. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 800-01 (recognizing that “it is fundamentally
Congress’s job, not [the Court’s], to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity”
because “Congress . . . has the greater capacity ‘to weigh and accommodate the competing
policy concerns and reliance interests’ involved.” (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759)).
347. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755 (“To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation
conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.”); see also
Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 513-14 (holding that, while the Tribe had a duty to collect state
taxes on cigarette sales to nonmembers at its convenience store, the state could not sue the
Tribe directly to collect the taxes or require it to collect taxes from buyers in the future).
348. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 814 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing with three
other justices that sovereign immunity should not “bar suits arising out of an Indian tribe’s
commercial activities conducted outside its territory”); Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity is founded upon an
anachronistic fiction. In my opinion all Governments—federal, state, and tribal—should
generally be accountable for their illegal conduct.” (citation omitted)).
349. See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788-90, 797-803.
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reservation activities. Given the disentangling of sovereign immunity from
land status, the ability to exercise sovereignty over the land at issue is
simply not a prerequisite for asserting sovereign immunity.350 Any force
these arguments may have had evaporated when the Court reiterated these
principles with no mention of Sherrill in the 2014 Bay Mills decision.351
Conclusion
This Article serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that Sherrill has
sown confusion in the lower courts over how to apply its concerns about
disruption to non-Indian justifiable expectations. The Court pulled together
a new doctrine from themes and principles of established doctrines but
failed to provide guidance on when this new doctrine would apply. Lower
courts are therefore in conflict over Sherrill’s relevance. For example, over
strong dissents, the Second Circuit has applied Sherrill to create an inherent
disruption rule that bars all tribal land claims regardless of remedy. Courts
are split on whether and how Sherrill applies to reservation diminishment
and other treaty rights disputes or assertions of tribal sovereign immunity.
Although percolation of ideas among the lower courts can be positive, this
confusion creates substantial risk for tribes in litigation: If a tribe is
assigned to a judge with a broad understanding of Sherrill and its concerns
about disruption to non-Indian justifiable expectations, it risks losing its suit
despite strong arguments based on traditional doctrine.
In addition, this Article closely analyzes Sherrill to develop a faithful
interpretation that can inform attempts to apply the decision to new facts.
Sherrill was the Court’s response to a unique prospective remedy in a land
claim litigation seeking to permit a tribe to exercise its sovereignty after
350. Both Madison County and New York made this argument in the OIN litigation. See
Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants at 61, Oneida
Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-6408-cv(L)), 2007
WL 6432637; Brief of Amicus Curiae State of New York in Support of DefendantsCounterclaimants-Appellants Madison County and Oneida County Seeking Reversal at 10,
Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-6408-cv(L)),
2007 WL 6432640.
351. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (recognizing that Bay Mills provided “further guidance regarding both the
continuing vitality of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit and the propriety of
drawing distinctions that might constrain the broad sweep of that immunity in the absence of
express action by Congress.”). The Court’s reaffirmance in Bay Mills that tribal sovereign
immunity is broader than tribal sovereign authority also undermines the argument that
Kiowa said that the two were not coextensive only in dicta. See, e.g., New York v.
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 155-56 (2d. Cir. 2012) (Hall, J., dissenting).
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two centuries. This understanding explains why lower courts should not
import Sherrill’s equitable concerns about disruption to non-Indian
justifiable expectations into every dispute involving Indian tribes. The
Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule, for example, ignores Sherrill’s
focus on only prospective, disruptive remedies and its reaffirmation of
Oneida II. Courts applying Sherrill to tribal sovereignty and treaty disputes
have failed to consider that the decision does not fit within those established
doctrines and evinces significantly different concerns about disruption than
those at issue in these types of disputes.
Although courts should not apply Sherrill beyond prospective remedies
in tribal land claim litigation on doctrinal grounds, the worst consequence
of a broad understanding of Sherrill is not muddled doctrine. Resolution of
disputes between tribes and non-Indians through litigation inevitably leads
to a contentious relationship where both sides seek to “win” completely. An
unjustifiably broad understanding of Sherrill would accelerate this litigious
approach. Knowing they could pull out concerns about disruption to nonIndian expectations to defeat a wide range of tribal rights, state and local
governments would exert even more sovereign authority in Indian Country.
States and local governments would, along with non-Indian private parties,
pursue more litigation against tribes.
This litigious approach makes much less likely the optimal solution to
these types of disputes: a negotiated settlement between the parties.352 Such
a resolution has special importance in federal Indian law. Disputes between
tribes and non-Indians float above a sea of complex policy and moral issues
concerning the destruction and subjugation of Indian tribes for over four
centuries.353 These issues defy simple solutions; as a society, we will
probably never satisfactorily resolve them. Encouraging tribes and nonIndians to resolve their conflicts through negotiated settlements not only
allows both sides to “win,” but also helps society take baby steps in coming
to terms with these underlying policy and moral questions. An overly broad
352. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 n.3
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that a settlement between the parties would “be the best final
result”), aff’d, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated as moot and remanded, 562 U.S. 42
(2011) (per curiam); Fletcher, supra note 117, at 103 (arguing that the ideal resolution of
tribal-state disputes is a negotiated settlement that harmonizes tribal and state interests, such
as incorporation of the reservation into local zoning plans, sharing of gaming revenue, or
cross-deputization of law enforcement).
353. See, e.g., Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783,
2013 WL 3992830, at *16 n.27 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (noting that the “historical
injustice” in the tribal land claim might not be just the unlawful land transfer but also “the
ongoing oppression or mistreatment of native peoples by state and local governments”).
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application of Sherrill does the opposite by giving non-Indians a guaranteed
win that allows courts to paper over these questions.
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